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ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS
by
Leigh Ann Leung
Adviser: Professor David Jaeger
Health is defined as an individual’s mental or physical condition and being healthy means
to be free from illness or injury. Health is relevant to both the supply and demand sides
of the national economy. On the demand side, consumers derive satisfaction from being
healthy. Consumers purchase goods and services to improve their health but also engage
in activities that impair health such as smoking or drinking too much. On the supply side,
firms produce health care goods and services to meet the market demand for health care
derived from consumers’ demand for better health. In addition, health augments labor
inputs since the healthier the population, the larger the labor force and the higher the
marginal productivity of labor, as in fewer sick days. This dissertation is comprised of three
essays related to the effect of social environments and economic incentives on health and
health behaviors.
The first essay examines whether whether immigrants converge towards natives’ level of
smoking prevalence with assimilation. Results show that assimilation is associated with a
greater likelihood of being a smoker for immigrants from lower smoking countries relative
to the U.S. and a lower likelihood of being smoker for immigrants from higher smoking
countries. Differences in responsiveness to taxes or smoke free air laws cannot explain the
convergence in smoking rates between immigrants from higher and lower smoking countries.
The second essay examines the effect of mortgage debt on health. Homeownership in
the U.S. is promoted through the use of financing. These policies improve the liquidity
of the housing market and make homeownership more affordable. But it also encourages
greater consumption of mortgage debt. Using mortgage loan to value (LTV) as a proxy
for financial stress, I show that homeowners with high LTVs are more likely to be in poor
health.
The third essay examines the effect of unemployment duration on health. I hypothesis
v
that unemployment duration affects health through financial stress. Results show that high
mortgage loan to value is not significantly correlated with most measures of poor health
but when interacted with high home leverage is positively and significantly correlated with
poor health. However, I cannot rule out reverse causality given that those in poor health
have a significant likelihood of having high LTV in the next period.
vi
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1 Healthy and unhealthy assimilation:





Smoking rates in the country of origin were used to empirically examine whether immigrants
converge towards natives’ level of smoking prevalence with assimilation. Results show that
assimilation is associated with a greater likelihood of being a smoker for immigrants from
lower smoking countries relative to the U.S. and a lower likelihood of being smoker for im-
migrants from higher smoking countries. Moreover, assimilation is associated with a greater
likelihood of ever quitting smoking among immigrants from higher smoking countries and a
greater likelihood of ever initiating smoking among immigrants from lower smoking coun-
tries. This study then investigates whether differences in responsiveness to taxes or smoke
free air laws can explain the convergence in smoking rates between immigrants from higher
and lower smoking countries. Results from the hazard of smoking initiation and cessation
estimations show that elasticities are not significantly different between immigrants from
higher and lower smoking countries. Therefore, tobacco taxes or smoke free air laws cannot
explain the opposite assimilation pattern between higher and lower smoking countries.
Author Keywords: Determinants of health, Smoking, Assimilation, Tax
JEL classification codes: I18
1.1 Introduction
The healthy immigrant effect (HIE) refers to two observations – that immigrants have better
health relative to native-born residents (natives) upon arrival and that with assimilation,
immigrants converge to the health of natives. This effect has been documented in a number
of developed countries with large immigrant populations (Kennedy et al., 2006 for Australia
and United Kingdom, McDonald and Kennedy, 2005, Deri, 2005 for Canada, Lechner and
Mielck, 1998 for Germany, and House et al., 1990, Stephen et al., 1994 for United States)
for health outcomes such as obesity, diabetes, cancer, smoking, alcohol dependence, and
depression.
Two hypotheses have been proposed to explain the first part of the healthy immigrant
effect. One hypothesis suggests that healthier immigrants are self-selected to migrate. Ac-
cording to the self-selection hypothesis, recent immigrants should be healthier than both
natives and the population in the country of origin. The other, referred to as the social
norms hypothesis, suggests that recent immigrants are healthier than the native popula-
tion because of habits and behaviors acquired in the country of origin that promote better
health. According to the social norms hypothesis, recent immigrants should be healthier
than natives but are otherwise similar in health to the population in the country of origin.
Unlike the self-selection hypothesis, the social norms hypothesis also explains the second
part of the healthy immigrant effect. With assimilation, immigrants relinquish the healthy
habits and behaviors acquired in the country of origin and instead adopt those of natives. As
a consequence, immigrants converge to the health of natives, a process known as unhealthy
assimilation.
Previous studies have shown that body mass index (BMI) levels for recent immigrants
were lower than that of natives but with longer durations in the receiving country, immi-
grants’ BMIs converged to that of natives (McDonald and Kennedy, 2005 in Canada and
Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Kaushal, 2009 in the U.S.). The rate of convergence varied
depending on country of origin and the level of education at migration. Other studies using
likelihood of poor health, activity limitations, and presence of a chronic condition as health
measures have shown that recent immigrants arrive healthier but converge to natives’ health
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levels with assimilation (Deri, 2005 in Canada and Lechner and Mielck, 1998 in Germany).
Studies using smoking as a health measure have found that recent immigrants are less likely
to smoke compared to natives but the likelihood depends on gender, foreign-born status,
and degree of assimilation (Baluja et al., 2003, Acevedo-Garcia et al., 2005, Huang, 2008
in the U.S. and Wilkinson et al., 2005, Angel et al., 2001 for Mexican immigrants in the
U.S.). These studies examined the effect of foreign-born status on propensity to smoke but
did not model smoking behavior by country of origin.
Existing evidence supporting the social norms explanation argue that immigrants ac-
quired healthy behaviors prior to migration (Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Kaushal, 2009).
However, these studies typically estimate the effect of assimilation on health for the “aver-
age” immigrant. For example, in the U.S., Mexican-Americans comprise the largest share
of immigrants. Therefore, the estimated effect of assimilation on health would be largely
driven by the experience of this group. But not all immigrants acquired healthy behaviors
in the origin country. If immigrants identify with social norms in the country of origin and
smoking is more socially accepted in some countries than others, then some immigrants will
be more receptive to smoking than others. In this case, the average effect of assimilation
on propensity to smoke may conceal different patterns of assimilation depending on the
country of origin.
The goal of this study is to empirically test the social norms hypothesis for immigrants
in the U.S. using smoking as a case study health behavior. The hypothesis suggests two
testable predictions regarding smoking behavior among immigrants: 1) the higher the smok-
ing prevalence in a sending country, the more likely a recent immigrant from that country
will be a smoker and 2) assimilation should increase the propensity to smoke for immigrants
from countries where smoking is not the social norm but should decrease the propensity to
smoke for immigrants from countries where smoking is the social norm, the latter exempli-
fying healthy assimilation.
This study contributes to the literature on the healthy immigrant effect with new ev-
idence on the social norms hypothesis. Consistent with the hypothesis, I show that with
assimilation, immigrants converge to natives’ smoking behaviors. Specifically, assimilation
is associated with a greater likelihood of being a smoker for immigrants from lower smoking
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countries relative to the U.S. and a lower likelihood of being a smoker for immigrants from
higher smoking countries. Moreover, assimilation is associated with a greater likelihood of
ever quitting smoking among immigrants from higher smoking countries and a greater like-
lihood of ever initiating smoking among immigrants from lower smoking countries. After
adjusting for socioeconomic factors, smoking prevalence rates among immigrants by country
of origin is similar to smoking prevalence rates in the respective country of origin.
This study also investigates whether differences in responsiveness to tobacco tax or
smoke free air laws can explain the convergence in smoking rates between immigrants from
higher and lower smoking countries. Results for the hazards of smoking initiation and
cessation suggest that anti-smoking policies do not have a significant effect on initiation but
do affect cessation. Therefore, immigrants from lower smoking countries are likely to start
smoking and those from higher smoking countries are likely to quit.
1.2 Estimation
1.2.1 Data
Individual-level data on immigrants was obtained from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) Tobacco Use Supplement (TUS)1. Seventeen cross-sections from 1995 to 2007 were
pooled. The sample was restricted to foreign-born individuals age 18 to 65 at the time of
survey who immigrated to the U.S. after 1949. Observations with missing data for country
of origin, years since migration, year of arrival, or socioeconomic factors were excluded.
Countries with fewer than 100 observations for each gender were also excluded. The re-
sulting dataset contains 98,842 observations representing 66 countries2. Tables 1.1 and 1.2
summarize the individual characteristics by estimation sample, gender, and origin country
1The CPS is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) that contains demographic and tobacco-use data for foreign- and native-born individuals in the U.S.
The TUS, funded by the National Cancer Institute (NCI), is a supplemental survey periodically appended
to the CPS to capture information on current attitudes towards smoking and on current and retrospective
tobacco use
2The pooled CPS-TUS dataset of all foreign born individuals age 18 to 65 at the time of survey who
immigrated to the U.S. after 1949 has 112,495 observations. Of these, 13,265 were dropped due to missing
values in each of the relevant variables yielding 99,230 observations. Of these, 388 observations were dropped




An ideal dataset matches immigrants to gender-specific smoking rates for the country of
origin in the year of migration. But historical data on smoking prevalence is not available
for all origin countries and for all years of migration. This is particularly the case for de-
veloping countries which are typically the immigrant-sending countries. As an alternative,
gender-specific smoking rates as of 2006 or the nearest previous surveyed year were aver-
aged when possible across two sources – World Health Organization Tobacco-Free Initiative
(WHOTFI) and the Worldbank Global Development Indicators (WGDI). Immigrant and
origin population smoking rates are summarized in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 for higher and lower
smoking prevalence countries relative to the U.S. Most immigrant men are from countries
with higher male smoking rates and most immigrant women are from countries with lower
female smoking rates.
1.2.2 Variable definitions
A valid measure of an immigrant’s level of assimilation is the degree to which the immigrant
identifies with the social norms in the sending country relative to that in the receiving coun-
try. Waters and Jimenez (2005) identified four dimensions of assimilation: socioeconomic
status, language, intermarriage, and residential concentration. Intermarriage and lower
residential concentration assimilation are typically observed over several generations and
hence not less relevant for this study which examines smoking behavior among foreign-born
immigrants. Language attainment, or the ability to speak English in this case, would not
be a valid measure of assimilation in the context health assimilation for immigrants from
English-speaking countries. Assimilation in socioeconomic status, including earnings and
educational attainment, is typically measured as a linear process with years since migration
(Chiswick, 1978, Borjas, 1985, 1995, Schoeni, 1998, Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Lubotsky,
2007). Years since migration was chosen as the measure of the degree of assimilation in this
study. This has the additional advantage of allowing for comparison with previous studies
that estimate the effect of assimilation on health using the same measure.
Years since migration was calculated as the difference between the survey year and the
immigrant’s year of arrival. In the CPS, the year of arrival was surveyed as a categorical
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variable indicating a range of two or more years. To construct a continuous variable for years
since migration, the year of arrival was recoded with the midpoint value of the range for
each category3. Similarly, family income, also surveyed as a categorical variable indicating
a range of annual dollar amounts, was recoded to midpoint values except for the highest
bracket which was recoded to the lower bound.
The CPS-TUS provides a smoking status categorical variable that identifies an individual
as either an every day smoker, a some day smoker, a never smoker, or a former smoker. This
was used to create an indicator variable for current smoker which is defined as a person who,
at the time of interview, reported smoking every day or some days. For self-respondents,
the CPS-TUS asked retrospective questions about the age when the individual first smoked
regularly and the age when the individual completely stopped smoking. This information
was used along with age of migration to determine whether the individual initiated or quit
smoking in the country of origin or in the U.S. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of ages for
smoking initiation and Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of ages for smoking cessation. The
average age of initiation is 18.5 while the average age of smoking cessation is 33.7 years as
shown in Table 1.1.
Assuming that individuals experienced a single transition from non-smoker to smoker for
current smokers and from smoker to non-smoker for current former-smokers, censored panel
datasets were constructed to estimate the effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation and
cessation. The hazard to initiation sample consists of individuals who initiated smoking in
the U.S. and current never-smokers4. The hazard to cessation sample consists of ever-smoker
individuals who quit smoking in the U.S. and current smokers5. Table 1.1 summarizes the
individual characteristics for these two samples.
3Year of arrival recoded with the minimum value, instead of the midpoint value, of the year of arrival
range did not materially change the results.
4Age of smoking initiation was calculated using the responses to the survey question “How old (were/was)
(you/name) when (you/he/she) first started smoking cigarettes FAIRLY REGULARLY”. A respondent may
have smoked his/her first cigarette at an earlier age but only the age when they started smoking fairly regular
smoking was used in the starting hazard model.
5Age of smoking cessation was calculated using the responses to the survey question “About how long
has it been since you COMPLETELY quit smoking cigarettes?”. A respondent may have had one or more
quit attempts in the past but only the most recent quit attempt was used in for quitting hazard model.
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1.2.3 Smoking prevalence in the U.S. from 1995 to 2007
Smoking prevalence was calculated as the sample-weighted average of the current smoking
indicator variable. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the prevalence of smoking in each survey year
by high-low country of origin, by long/short duration since migration. Smoking prevalence
has declined for all groups in this period. Previous studies have attributed this decline
to higher cigarette taxes (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000), higher prevalence of work place
smoking bans (Evans et al., 1999), and a gradual shift towards anti-smoking sentiment
(DeCicca et al., 2008). Figure 1.5 shows smoking prevalence by high-low country of origin
and long/short duration since migration. Smoking prevalence for assimilated immigrants
from lower smoking countries are higher than that for short duration immigrants. Smoking
prevalence for assimilated immigrants from higher smoking countries are lower than that for
short duration immigrants in years 1995/1996 and 2000/2001 but higher in years 2002/2003
and 2006/2007. The variability of smoking prevalence among recent immigrants from higher
smoking countries may be due to differences in immigrant cohorts over time.
1.2.4 An immigrant’s likelihood of being a current smoker
A country has a set of social norms that govern acceptable behavior. Higher smoking
prevalence in a country indicates that smoking is more socially acceptable which in turn
influences an individual’s decision to smoke. These norms influence behavior even after
an individual decides to emigrate. Therefore, origin population smoking rates can be used
to examine the pattern of smoking among immigrants. If immigrants identify with the
social norms in the country of origin, then recent immigrants from high smoking countries
are more likely to be smokers while those from low smoking countries are less likely to
be smokers. Furthermore, the social norms hypothesis predicts that with assimilation,
immigrants converge towards natives’ level of smoking prevalence.
Income is an important determinant of an immigrant’s likelihood of being a current
smoker. Bobak et al. (2000) looked at the relationship between tobacco use and poverty
and found that while smoking is more common among poor men than rich men in nearly
all countries, the income gradient of smoking is smaller in developed countries. Two other
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important factors are years since migration, which captures the degree of assimilation,
and year of arrival, which captures potential differences in smoking rates by arrival cohort.
Since years since migration and year of survey linearly determine year of arrival given pooled
cross-sectional data (Borjas, 1985), survey year was used to control for cohort effects.
The probability of being a current smoker is modeled as a linear function of income, years
since migration, year of survey, and demographic controls. Since previous studies found
differences in the rate of earnings assimilation and in arrival cohorts by country of origin, the
parameters for these three variables were allowed to vary by country of origin. Unobserved,
time-invariant country-specific factors were captured with country indicators. Variables
for female, age, education, marital status, number of household members, metropolitan
residence were assumed to affect an immigrant’s likelihood of being a current smoker in the
same way regardless of the origin country. Finally, all parameters were allowed to vary by
gender.
The linear probability model for an immigrant’s likelihood of being a smoker is given by
Pr[S = 1|x] = αc + αc × (βcAssimilation+ γcIncome+ δcY ear) +XΘ (1.1)
where S is an indicator for current smoker, αc is an indicator for country of origin c, βc
is the country-specific effect of assimilation, γc is a country-specific effect of the natural
log of income, δc is the country-specific effect of a linear time trend, Xi is a vector of
individual-specific demographic variables for female, age, education, marital status, number
of household members, and metropolitan residence, and Θ is a vector of the coefficients on
X.
An alternate specification replaces the country fixed effects in equation 1.1 with a single
continuous variable for the smoking rates in the country of origin. This specification allows
for estimation of the effect of origin country smoking prevalence as a single coefficient which
is interpreted as the correlation coefficient between smoking rates in the origin country
populations and smoking rates among immigrants. The linear probability model using
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country of origin smoking rates is given by
Pr[S = 1|x] = λOrigin+ αc × (βcAssimilation+ γcIncome+ δcY ear) +XΘ (1.2)
where λ is the effect of origin country smoking prevalence. The average partial effect of
assimilation from equation 1.2 can be expressed as6








where βc is the effect of assimilation for immigrants from country c from equation 1.2, N is
the number of observations, C is the number of countries, and αci equals one if individual
i is from country c.
Countries of origin were categorized as higher and lower smoking prevalence relative to
U.S. smoking prevalence depending on whether the mean smoking rate in the country of
origin was greater or less than that in the U.S. for 2006 by gender. The average partial effect
of assimilation for immigrants from countries with higher (lower) smoking rates relative to
the U.S. was calculated by summing over only the higher (lower) smoking countries.
Since smoking prevalence varies by state in the U.S., an alternate method is to categorize
countries of origin as higher and lower relative to smoking prevalence in an immigrant’s state
of residence7. The average partial effect of assimilation was calculated using this method
as well.
6The average marginal effect of assimilation for a general binary response model is given by







∂ Pr[S = 1|x]
∂Assimilation
βc (1.3)
where Pr[S = 1|x] = G(Origin+ αc × (βcAssimilation+ γcIncome+ δcY ear) +XΘ). Note that G(z) = z
for the linear probability model, G(z) =
∫ z





7This assumes that immigrants remained in the current state of residence since arrival to the U.S. (Kritz
and Nogle, 1994, Newbold, 1999, Nogle, 1997, Funkhouser, 2000).
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1.2.5 Estimation results for an immigrant’s likelihood of being a current
smoker
Equations 1.1–1.4 were estimated using ordinary least squares8. Results for equations 1.1–
1.4 are shown in Table 1.5. The effect of assimilation on an immigrant’s likelihood of ever
initiating and likelihood of ever quitting smoking was estimated using the same specifications
as equations 1.1–1.4 with the left-hand side variable replaced an indicator variable for ever
initiated smoking and ever quit smoking, respectively. Results of these regressions are shown
in Tables 1.6 and 1.7.
For all three outcomes in Tables 1.5–1.7, the first column shows the country fixed ef-
fects specification while the last three columns show the continuous variable for origin
country smoking prevalence specification. In all three tables, the estimated coefficients on
socioeconomic variables in columns (3) and (4) are the same as in column (2) and there-
fore suppressed for readability. For conciseness, estimated effects are reported as average
marginal effects9. Errors are clustered in groups of gender by origin country10.
Effect of assimilation on an immigrant’s likelihood of being a current smoker
The effect of assimilation is positive but insignificant in columns (1) and (2). When the
effect of assimilation is interacted with the indicator variable for origin country smoking
prevalence relative to the U.S., the separated effects become significant with opposite signs.
Column (3) shows that immigrants from countries with higher smoking rates relative to
the U.S. are 0.0638 percentage points less likely to be smokers while those from countries
with lower smoking rates are 0.138 percentage points more likely to be smokers per year
in the U.S. Column (4), using state of residence smoking rates, shows immigrants from
countries with higher smoking rates are 0.0628 percentage points less likely to be smokers,
and immigrants from countries with lower smoking rates are 0.128 percentage points more
likely to be smokers per year in the U.S. The assimilation effects separated by higher/lower
8Equations 1.1–1.4 were also estimated as logit models using maximum likelihood estimation with similar
results.
9Parameters for years since migration, time trend, and log income vary by country and gender while the
parameters on socioeconomic variables vary by gender.
10Clustering by origin country did not materially change the results.
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origin smoking prevalence are significantly different from each other for both columns (3)
and (4).
The estimated effect of assimilation does not materially change when the state of resi-
dence smoking rates are used as the basis for comparison. Immigrants from higher smoking
countries are 0.0628 percentage points less likely to be smokers while those from lower smok-
ing countries are 0.128 percentage points more likely to be smokers per additional year in
the U.S. Again, a Wald test confirmed that the two estimates are significantly different11.
Effect of origin population smoking prevalence on an immigrant’s likelihood of
being a current smoker
Table 1.5 column (2) shows the estimation results for equation 1.2. The estimated effect of
origin country smoking prevalence is 0.929. This suggests that a 10 percent increase in the
origin country smoking rate is associated with 9 percent increase in the likelihood that a
recent immigrant is a current smoker, almost a one-to-one relationship.
Effect of assimilation on an immigrant’s likelihood of ever initiating and ever
quitting smoking
The likelihood of ever initiating smoking and ever quitting smoking can be used as outcome
variables to verify whether assimilation is associated with quitting behavior for immigrants
from higher smoking countries and initiating behavior for immigrants from lower smoking
countries. The models for likelihood of ever initiating and ever quitting smoking is given
by
Pr[EverStart = 1|x] = λOrigin+ αc × (βcAssimilation+ δcY ear) + female+ age (1.5)
11This pattern for the effect of assimilation holds when the sample is split by year of immigration pre-
and post-1985 and when when the sample is limited to a subset of OECD countries (Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and United Kingdom) where historical data
on smoking prevalence rates from 1960 to 2007 were available. In the case of splitting the sample by year
of migration, the estimated effect of assimilation for higher and lower smoking countries are insignificantly
different from zero, though they are significantly different from each other at the 10 percent level. In the case
of limiting the sample to OECD countries, the estimated effect of assimilation is negative and significant at
the 10 percent level for higher smoking countries and insignificant for lower smoking countries, though they
are insignificantly different from each other. These results are available from the author upon request.
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Pr[EverQuit = 1|x] = λOrigin+ αc × (βcAssimilation+ δcY ear) + female+ age (1.6)
where only time-invariant explanatory variables are used since the full set of socioeconomics
variables are not available at the year in which the respondent started or quit smoking. The
outcome variable in equation 1.5, EverStart, is an indicator variable which is equal to one
if the individual ever-smoked and zero otherwise. The outcome variable in equation 1.6,
EverQuit, is an indicator variable which is equal to one if the individual ever-quit and zero
otherwise and the sample was restricted to ever-smokers.
Estimation results for the likelihood of ever-initiating among immigrants are shown in
Table 1.6. Assimilation is associated with a higher likelihood of initiation as shown in
columns (1) and (2). When the effect is interacted with the indicator for origin country
smoking prevalence relative to the U.S., assimilation is larger for immigrants from lower
smoking countries as shown in columns (3) and (4). Immigrants from lower smoking coun-
tries are more likely to have ever initiated smoking.
Estimation results for the likelihood of ever-quitting among immigrant ever-smokers are
shown in Table 1.7. Assimilation is associated with a higher probability of cessation as
shown in columns (1) and (2). Columns (3) and (4) show the assimilation effect for higher
and lower smoking prevalence in the origin countries relative to the U.S. The estimated
effect is positive and only significant for immigrants from higher smoking countries. This
suggests that immigrants from higher smoking countries are more likely to have ever quit
smoking.
Relative rates of health assimilation
The effect of assimilation for smoking prevalence can be compared to that for other health
measures. There are two studies that have examined health assimilation in the U.S., both
using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). Kaushal (2009) used obesity
prevalence as a health measure and Antecol and Bedard (2006) used obesity prevalence, like-
lihood of poor health, presence of a chronic condition, and presence of an activity limitation
as health measures12. The effect of assimilation was estimated using indicator variables for
12Obesity is defined as BMI greater than or equal to 30.
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ranges of years since migration in increments of 5 years ending with an indicator for 15
or more years. To obtain a per year effect, I divided the estimates by 5 and to obtain a
single estimate for assimilation, I averaged the coefficients across the indicator variables for
assimilation.
With these adjustments, the assimilation effect for obesity prevalence from Kaushal
(2009) is 0.53 percentage points per year and from Antecol and Bedard (2006) is 0.52 per-
centage points. From Antecol and Bedard (2006), the assimilation effect for the likelihood
of poor health is 0.59 percentage points, presence of a chronic condition is 1.05 percentage
points, and presence of an activity limitation is 0.82 percentage points. The assimilation
effect for smoking prevalence presented in this study is 0.064 percentage points for immi-
grants from higher smoking countries and 0.138 percentage points for immigrants from lower
smoking countries. For the likelihood of ever-quitting and the likelihood of ever-initiating
smoking, the assimilation effect is 0.177 and 0.255 percentage points, respectively.
The pace of assimilation for smoking is slower than that for other health measures.
But since smoking prevalence among immigrants is relatively low, 13 percent versus 21
percent for natives, assimilation could still have a material impact on the incidence of
smoking among immigrants even in the medium term if there is a change in the pattern of
migration. For example, if recent immigrants are from lower smoking countries, 10 years
of living in the U.S. would add 1.38 percentage points to current smoking prevalence, a
10 percent increase. If recent immigrants are from higher smoking countries, 10 years of
living in the U.S. would subtract 0.64 percentage point from current smoking prevalence, a
5 percent decrease.
1.2.6 An immigrant’s hazard of smoking initiation and cessation
States have instituted cigarette excise taxes as far back as 1940 (Lillard et al., 2011) and
smoke free air restrictions began in 1973 with Arizona (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).
Previous studies suggest that both taxes and restrictions have been effective in reducing
smoking prevalence (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). Can differences in responsiveness to
taxes or restrictions explain the difference in assimilation between immigrants from countries
with higher and lower smoking prevalences relative to the U.S.?
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An immigrant’s “exposure” to cigarette taxes and restrictions in the state of residence
depends on age at migration and years since arrival. Therefore, a discrete time hazard
model was chosen to estimate the effect of cigarette taxes and restrictions13. The panel
dataset of immigrants, constructed using retrospective data, begins in the year of arrival
and ends at the year of event (initiation or cessation) or censored at the survey year if the
event does not occur14. The state tobacco excise tax data is available from 1965 while smoke
free air restrictions data is available from 1991. Cigarette taxes were adjusted for inflation
using the average annual consumer price index. Smoke free air restrictions is coded as an
indicator variable equal to one if there existed any smoke free air restriction in the state for
a given year.
The hazard to smoking initiation is modeled as a linear probability given by15
Pr[Start = 1|x] = αH × (πHTaxst + ηHSFAst) + αL × (πLTaxst + ηLSFAst)
+βj + ωa + τt + νs + αH + female
(1.7)
Similarly, the hazard to smoking cessation is modeled as a linear probability given by
Pr[Quit = 1|x, EverStart = 1] = αH × (πHTaxst + ηHSFAst)
+ αL × (πLTaxst + ηLSFAst) + βj + ωa + τt + νs + αH + female
(1.8)
where αH (αL) is an indicator for higher (lower) smoking country, Taxst is the natural
log of the inflation-adjusted cigarette excise tax in a state and year, SFAst is an indicator
13A number of studies have examined smoking behavior using discrete time hazard models including
Douglas and Hariharan (1994), Douglas (1998), DeCicca et al. (2002), Nonnemaker and Farrelly (2011),
Lillard et al. (2011). The advantage of this approach is that the window between migration and smoking
initiation or cessation is much wider than the survey period which allows for more variation in taxes over
time and across states. The disadvantage is that immigrants are assumed to have remained in the state of
residence since arrival to the U.S. The validity of this assumption has been examined in the literature on
inter-state mobility of immigrants. For example, Kritz and Nogle (1994), Newbold (1999), Nogle (1997),
Funkhouser (2000) found that while some immigrants move across states, most immigrants remain in the
port-of-entry state. Nogle (1997) provides summary statistics for the share of immigrants that moved inter-
state in the U.S. between 1985 and 1990. They show that the share who moved inter-state, 7%, is much less
than the share that lived abroad or remained in the same state, 18% and 75%, respectively. However, the
share of inter-state movers ranges from 3% to 16% depending on the state.
14Time to initiation was calculated as the number of years from age at migration to the age that the
individual reported regular smoking. Time to cessation was calculated as the number of years from age at
migration to the age that the individual reported quitting smoking.
15Both hazard to starting and quitting were also estimated as logit models using maximum likelihood
estimation. These results, which are available upon request, are not materially different from those using
OLS estimation.
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variable for presence of a smoke free air law in a state and year, βj is an indicator variable
for the duration spell, ωa is an indicator variable for age, τt is an indicator for year, νs is
an indicator for state, and female is an indicator for female.
For the hazard to initiation estimation, individuals who reported initiating in the origin
country were excluded. Likewise, for the hazard to cessation estimation, individuals who
reported quitting in the origin country were excluded. Indicators for age, year, and state
were used to control for time-invariant differences across states and age or year dependent
differences in smoking behavior.
1.2.7 Estimation results for hazard of smoking initiation and cessation
The estimation results for the effects of cigarette taxes and smoke free air preemptions on
an immigrant’s hazard of initiating and quitting smoking are shown in Table 1.8. Columns
(1) and (3) show the estimated effects of inflation-adjusted tobacco excise taxes and the
presence of any smoke free air preemption for starting and quitting hazards, respectively.
Columns (2) and (4) separates the estimated effects by immigrants from higher and lower
smoking prevalence relative to the U.S. for starting and quitting hazards, respectively.
Tax elasticities were calculated at the mean values of the outcome variables. Price elas-
ticities were calculated using the estimated tax elasticity and an estimate for the relationship
between cigarette price and tax from Sumner, 198116.
For the hazard to smoking initiation, the estimated effect of taxes is not significant and
not significantly different between immigrants from higher and lower smoking countries.
The estimated effect of smoke free air laws is significant at the 10th percentile level for
immigrants from higher smoking countries though the effect is not statistically significantly
different for immigrants from higher and lower smoking countries.
For hazard to smoking cessation, the estimated effect of taxes is again insignificant
and insignificantly different between immigrants from higher and lower smoking countries.
However, the effect of smoke free air preemptions is significant at the 99th percentile level.
16ϵ = η p∂t
t∂p
where p is the mean cigarette price, t is the mean cigarette tax, ϵ is the price elasticity, η is
the tax elasticity, and ∂t
∂p
is the effect of cigarette tax on price. The price elasticity was calculated using
∂t
∂p
= 1.069 from Sumner, 1981.
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Still the effect is not statistically significantly different for immigrants from higher and lower
smoking countries.
1.3 Discussion
This study tests whether immigrant smoking behavior supports the social norms hypothesis.
Results show that assimilation affects immigrants differently depending on the country of
origin. Immigrants from countries with higher smoking rates than the U.S. are less likely to
be smokers with assimilation while those from countries with lower smoking rates are more
likely to be smokers with assimilation. Since most immigrant men are from countries with
higher male smoking rates and most immigrant women are from countries with lower female
smoking rates, immigrant men tend to experience healthy assimilation while immigrant
women tend to experience unhealthy assimilation.
More broadly, these findings relate to the role of peer influences on smoking behavior.
Previous studies on peer effects have used schools (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001, Powell et al.,
2005, Fletcher, 2010), spouses (Cutler and Glaeser, 2010), and neighborhoods (Norton et al.,
1998) as social reference groups. Immigration can be viewed as a natural experiment in
which individuals move between country-based peer groups and assimilation measures the
effect of switching peers groups.
Consider a non-smoker who moves from a low smoking country to a high. The longer the
duration of stay in the new country, the more likely a non-smoker will interact with and be
influenced by smokers. On the other hand, a smoker who moves from a high smoking country
to a low, with longer duration of stay, is more likely to be influenced by anti-smoking policies
or non-smokers’ anti-smoking sentiment which can affect smoking behavior (DeCicca et al.,
2008). Even within a country, there may be variation in smoking rates by region. For
example, across states in the U.S., smoking rates range from 9.1 percent in Utah to 26.8
percent in West Virginia. Future research should explore whether a similar pattern exists
for individuals who move from a low smoking region to a high and vice versa.
This study also explores whether differences in responsiveness to cigarette taxes or smoke
free air laws can explain the observed pattern of assimilation. Taxes do not significantly
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affect the starting hazard among immigrants but presence of any smoke free air preemption
may have an effect for immigrants from higher smoking countries. As well, taxes do not
significantly affect the quitting hazard among immigrants but the presence of any smoke free
air preemption appears to significantly increase the quitting hazard similarly for immigrants
from higher smoking countries. In summary, differences in response to taxes or presence
of any smoke free air preemption cannot explain why, with assimilation, immigrants from
lower smoking countries have a higher starting hazard.
Immigrants comprise a fifth or more of the population in states like California, New
York, and New Jersey, and Florida. Understanding smoking behavior among immigrants
can inform anti-tobacco policy in these areas. For example, citing the high smoking rate
among Asian men, the New York City Health Department recently launched a new public
education campaign with graphic ads in Chinese offering nicotine patches and gum and a
Chinese language option for a hotline to enroll in the program (Nir, 2012), and a similar
program targeting the city’s Russian community is in the works. Interventions aimed at
reducing smoking prevalence among immigrants should not only include programs that
encourage immigrants from higher smoking countries to quit, but also ones that discourage
immigrants from lower smoking countries from starting.
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Table 1.1: Summary of individual characteristics (sample-weighted means)
Ever- Starting Hazard Quitting Hazard
All smokers 27 and under 27 and over
current smoker 0.13 0.54 0.03 0.82
income 39,847.35 40,958.63 36,810.15 38,629.63
years since migration 15.73 17.95 12.28 16.32
age at migration 22.92 23.62 15.58 26.82
age 38.63 41.55 27.85 43.14
less than high school 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.33
high school 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25
less than college 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.17
college 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.16
more than college 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08
female 0.50 0.31 0.52 0.30
married 0.67 0.68 0.53 0.71
members in HH 3.80 3.50 4.06 3.48
resides in MSA 0.74 0.77 0.70 0.71
share from country where smoking prevalence is:
greater than U.S. 0.49 0.70 0.44 0.71
less than U.S. 0.51 0.30 0.56 0.29
greater than state of residence 0.47 0.67 0.43 0.68
less than state of residence 0.53 0.33 0.57 0.32
age when first started smoking cigarettes fairly regularly 18.54 18.54 19.70 18.51
age when completely stopped smoking cigarettes 33.66 33.66 24.43 40.33
Observations 98,842 24,251 35,080 8,908
Smoking initiation hazard sample excludes immigrants who initiated prior to migration.
Smoking cessation hazard sample excludes immigrants who quit prior to migration and never-smokers.
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Table 1.2: Summary of individual characteristics by gender and origin country smoking
prevalence (sample-weighted means)
Origin country smoking prevalence is:
Greater than U.S. Less than U.S. Male Female
current smoker 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.07
income 40,911.69 38,831.42 39,981.83 39,715.44
years since migration 16.14 15.33 15.54 15.91
age at migration 22.81 23.02 22.54 23.29
age 38.94 38.34 38.07 39.18
less than high school 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.32
high school 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24
less than college 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.19
college 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.18
more than college 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.08
female 0.16 0.83 0.00 1.00
married 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.67
members in HH 3.74 3.85 3.84 3.75
resides in MSA 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75
share from country where smoking prevalence
greater than U.S. 1.00 0.00 0.82 0.16
less than U.S. 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.84
greater than state of residence 0.93 0.03 0.83 0.12
less than state of residence 0.07 0.97 0.17 0.88
age when first started smoking fairly regularly 18.27 19.19 18.12 19.47
age when completely stopped smoking 33.84 33.28 33.58 33.80
Observations 47,511 51,331 47,269 51,573
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Table 1.3: Gender-specific smoking rates in the country of origin and among immigrants
for countries where smoking prevalence is greater than the U.S.
Male Female
Country Sample Immigrant Country Sample Immigrant
Smoking rate Size Smoking rate Smoking rate Size Smoking rate
United States of America 0.24 47269 0.18 0.18 51573 0.05
Argentina 0.30 225 0.16 0.21 217 0.12
Armenia 0.58 110 0.45 . . .
Bangladesh 0.42 211 0.20 . . .
Bolivia 0.34 103 0.17 0.28 102 0.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.48 244 0.40 0.30 211 0.27
Cambodia 0.47 241 0.18 . . .
Chile 0.36 135 0.18 0.29 140 0.14
China 0.58 2399 0.13 . . .
Colombia 0.27 811 0.14 . . .
Costa Rica 0.25 105 0.14 . . .
Cuba 0.39 1521 0.22 0.25 1503 0.11
Czech Republic . . . 0.23 110 0.16
Egypt 0.32 243 0.23 . . .
France 0.32 240 0.26 0.24 233 0.18
Germany 0.32 688 0.22 0.22 1310 0.24
Greece 0.57 266 0.32 0.39 204 0.15
Hungary 0.42 144 0.24 0.31 132 0.17
India 0.43 2289 0.09 . . .
Indonesia 0.52 151 0.22 . . .
Iraq 0.28 135 0.23 . . .
Ireland 0.32 273 0.19 0.28 254 0.21
Italy 0.31 622 0.23 . . .
Japan 0.41 498 0.25 . . .
Jordan 0.54 111 0.39 . . .
Laos 0.60 339 0.21 . . .
Lebanon 0.46 230 0.23 0.32 179 0.15
Mexico 0.29 16440 0.18 . . .
Morocco 0.29 105 0.21 . . .
Netherlands 0.32 153 0.18 0.26 166 0.13
Pakistan 0.29 418 0.19 . . .
Philippines 0.45 2278 0.20 . . .
Poland 0.32 711 0.29 0.31 857 0.16
Portugal 0.31 426 0.24 . . .
Republic of Korea 0.53 1107 0.31 . . .
Romania 0.44 186 0.20 0.23 206 0.14
Russia 0.65 677 0.24 0.22 868 0.11
South Africa 0.29 130 0.16 . . .
Spain 0.34 132 0.19 0.25 137 0.20
Sweden . . . 0.19 103 0.14
Syrian Arab Republic 0.51 100 0.17 . . .
Thailand 0.38 208 0.28 . . .
Trinidad and Tobago 0.30 272 0.15 . . .
Turkey 0.51 173 0.35 0.18 123 0.18
Ukraine 0.64 239 0.20 0.20 258 0.12
United Kingdom 0.24 1103 0.20 0.22 1275 0.17
Venezuela 0.26 161 0.14 0.20 219 0.14
Viet Nam 0.38 1351 0.25 . . .
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Table 1.4: Gender-specific smoking rates in the country of origin and among immigrants
for countries where smoking prevalence is less than the U.S.
Male Female
Country Sample Immigrant Country Sample Immigrant
Smoking rate Size Smoking rate Smoking rate Size Smoking rate
United States of America 0.24 47269 0.18 0.18 51573 0.05
Armenia . . . 0.03 101 0.12
Australia 0.20 113 0.19 0.17 104 0.10
Bangladesh . . . 0.01 139 0.01
Barbados . . . 0.02 103 0.01
Brazil 0.18 382 0.19 0.12 465 0.13
Cambodia . . . 0.05 287 0.02
Canada 0.19 1293 0.17 0.16 1609 0.16
China . . . 0.03 2806 0.03
Colombia . . . 0.11 1073 0.08
Costa Rica . . . 0.08 132 0.10
Dominican Republic 0.15 1029 0.11 0.11 1633 0.08
Ecuador 0.15 558 0.13 0.03 610 0.05
Egypt . . . 0.01 150 0.04
El Salvador 0.22 1730 0.14 0.03 1763 0.04
Ethiopia 0.07 162 0.13 0.00 147 0.03
Ghana 0.07 133 0.05 . . .
Guatemala 0.16 947 0.15 0.02 793 0.03
Haiti . . . 0.04 736 0.02
Honduras . . . 0.02 547 0.04
India . . . 0.06 1950 0.01
Indonesia . . . 0.04 141 0.08
Iran 0.22 582 0.20 0.02 458 0.12
Iraq . . . 0.03 118 0.06
Israel 0.22 185 0.20 0.14 137 0.11
Italy . . . 0.18 556 0.11
Jamaica 0.23 703 0.14 0.08 988 0.05
Japan . . . 0.12 900 0.13
Laos . . . 0.13 337 0.03
Mexico . . . 0.09 14437 0.05
Nicaragua . . . 0.05 433 0.07
Nigeria 0.08 265 0.10 0.00 173 0.03
Pakistan . . . 0.04 308 0.02
Panama . . . 0.04 154 0.05
Peru 0.23 483 0.16 0.07 560 0.06
Philippines . . . 0.09 3554 0.05
Portugal . . . 0.13 431 0.08
Republic of Korea . . . 0.06 1592 0.09
South Africa . . . 0.09 116 0.08
Thailand . . . 0.02 408 0.08
Trinidad and Tobago . . . 0.05 390 0.05
Viet Nam . . . 0.02 1427 0.02
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Table 1.5: Effect of assimilation on an immigrant’s likelihood of current smoking: OLS
estimation using a linear probability model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
country smoking prevalence 0.929∗∗∗
(0.325)
years since migration 0.000358 0.000408
(0.000248) (0.000248)
years since migration for immigrants whose origin country smoking prevalence is:
greater than U.S. -0.000638∗∗∗
(0.000235)
less than U.S. 0.00138∗∗∗
(0.000245)
greater than state of residence -0.000628∗∗∗
(0.000242)
less than state of residence 0.00128∗∗∗
(0.000205)




high school -0.0100 -0.00974
(0.00633) (0.00651)










number of HH members -0.00704∗∗∗ -0.00712∗∗∗
(0.00114) (0.00115)
lives in MSA -0.00269 -0.00373
(0.00351) (0.00359)
Observations 98842 98842 98842 98842
R2 0.0740 0.0724 0.0724 0.0724
Origin country FE X
Robust errors in parentheses are clustered in groups of gender by origin country
Estimates of years since migration, log income, and year of survey are average marginal effects
H0: Marginal effects for years since migration are equal
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Effect of assimilation on an immigrant’s likelihood of ever initiating smoking:
OLS estimation using a linear probability model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
country smoking prevalence 0.487∗∗
(0.196)
years since migration 0.00133∗∗∗ 0.00124∗∗∗
(0.000286) (0.000286)
years since migration for immigrants whose origin country smoking prevalence is:
greater than U.S. 0.000668∗∗
(0.000326)
less than U.S. 0.00177∗∗∗
(0.000323)
greater than state of residence 0.000440
(0.000315)








Observations 98842 98842 98842 98842
R2 0.132 0.127 0.127 0.127
χ2 6.275 14.497
p-value 0.0122 0.0001
Origin country FE X
Robust errors in parentheses are clustered in groups of gender by origin country
Estimates of years since migration, log income, and year of survey are average marginal effects
H0: Marginal effects for years since migration are equal
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Effect of assimilation on an immigrant’s likelihood of ever quitting smoking: OLS
estimation using a linear probability model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
country smoking prevalence -0.203
(0.143)
years since migration 0.00177∗∗∗ 0.00173∗∗∗
(0.000560) (0.000563)
years since migration for immigrants whose origin country smoking prevalence is:
greater than U.S. 0.00255∗∗∗
(0.000508)
less than U.S. -0.0000847
(0.000742)
greater than state of residence 0.00266∗∗∗
(0.000506)








Observations 24251 24251 24251 24251
R2 0.0805 0.0773 0.0773 0.0773
χ2 12.043 13.016
p-value 0.0005 0.0003
Origin country FE X
Robust errors in parentheses are clustered in groups of gender by origin country
Estimates of years since migration, log income, and year of survey are average marginal effects
H0: Marginal effects for years since migration are equal
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
25
Table 1.8: Effect of cigarette tax and smoke free air preemption on an immigrant’s starting
and quitting hazards: OLS estimation using a discrete time hazard model.
Starting Hazard Quitting Hazard
27 and under 27 and under 27 and over 27 and over
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(real tax) 0.0000363 -0.00293
(0.000596) (0.00207)
greater than U.S. 0.000136 -0.00288
(0.000749) (0.00209)
less than U.S. -0.0000379 -0.00307
(0.000643) (0.00274)
Any smoke-free air preemption -0.000595 0.00666∗∗∗
(0.000473) (0.00179)
greater than U.S. -0.00125 0.00591∗∗∗
(0.000863) (0.00167)
less than U.S. -0.000130 0.00845∗∗
(0.000679) (0.00338)
Observations 202743 202743 63437 63437
Sample 35080 35080 8908 8908
R2 0.00865 0.00866 0.00657 0.00658
p-value (ln(real tax)) 0.806 0.933
p-value (any SFA laws) 0.356 0.426
tax elasticity 0.00494 -0.118
tax elasticity (> U.S.) 0.0113 -0.121
tax elasticity (< U.S.) -0.00963 -0.115
price elasticity 0.0250 -0.593
price elasticity (> U.S.) 0.0582 -0.613
price elasticity (< U.S.) -0.0482 -0.562
Robust errors in parentheses clustered by state
Models include indicators for female, higher smoking country, age, duration spell, state, and year
Tax elasticity evaluated at the mean initiation and cessation rate
H0: Marginal effects for are equal for higher and lower smoking countries
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Figure 1.5: Smoking prevalence by origin country smoking prevalence relative to the U.S.
and years since migration, 1995–2007.
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2 Effect of mortgage debt on health
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Abstract
This study examines the effect of mortgage debt on health among homeowners using six
waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) from 1998 to 2008. Health status is
measured by overall well being, incidence of high blood pressure, obesity, and depressive
symptoms. Using home prices as an instrument to identify the causal effect in an IV frame-
work, we found that a high mortgage loan to home value leads to a greater likelihood of
a decline in overall well being and the presence of a depressive symptom. Since home-
ownership in the U.S. is promoted through subsidized home financing, our findings have
important policy implications and also highlight the need to improve financial literacy.
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2.1 Introduction
Owner-occupied housing is a major asset on U.S. households’ balance sheet, accounting for
over a third of total assets (Poterba and Samwick (2001)). A number of social benefits are
associated with homeownership. Homeownership lengthens housing tenure by increasing the
cost of relocating and reducing household mobility. Longer housing tenure promotes family
stability and better child outcomes. Longer housing tenure is also associated with better
self-reported health (Dietz and Haurin (2003), Pollack et al. (2004)). Homeowners have
an incentive to improve housing structures and participate in political and social activities.
Though homeowners bear the cost of capital reinvestments and community engagement,
neighboring homeowners benefit as well through higher home valuations1 (Dietz and Haurin
(2003), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003)).
Since home purchases require a great deal more capital than households typically have
on hand, most home sales are financed. While homes constitute a large share of household
assets, home mortgages constitute a large share of household liabilities. U.S. policy encour-
ages homeownership but little is understood about the ramifications of the concomitant
debt. In fact, the government’s subsidy of mortgage financing2 encourages leverage over
equity in home purchases and greater consumption of housing than households would have
chosen if these subsidies did not exist (Glaeser and Shapiro (2003)). In 2008, 93 percent of
homes purchased involved financing, though in 2010, this declined to 91 percent (Hale (2009,
2010)). The prevalence of house financing is also affected by the interaction between policy
and economic conditions. During periods of mortgage credit expansion, riskier homebuyers
can also qualify for mortgages, thereby increasing the prevalence of mortgage finance in
home sales (Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2010)).
While homeownership leads to positive social outcomes, mortgage indebtedness poten-
tially leads to negative health outcomes. We use Grossman’s (1972) model of health as
a stock variable, which depreciates over time but can be augmented by combining time,
1The externality works in the opposite direction since a foreclosure lowers neighboring home values.
2The cost of borrowing is subsidized by allowing interest paid on mortgages to be deducted from income
(Rosen (1985)) and through government guarantees which reduce the credit risk of mortgage loans, essentially
lowering the interest rate.
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income, and medical care, to illustrate the potential negative impact of mortgage indebt-
edness on health. We hypothesize a direct and an indirect path through which mortgage
indebtedness leads to poor health. First, higher mortgage indebtedness increases financial
stress. Epidemiological studies have found that stress plays a role in cardiovascular disease
(Dorian and Taylor (1984)). Previous studies have also found that stress affects both the
contraction of and progression of certain diseases (Calcagni and Elenkov (2006), Contrada
and Baum (2009)), and in particular stress can increase the probability of catching a cold
(Takkouche et al. (2001)). Financial stress can also lead to unhealthy behaviors such as
drinking, smoking, or substance abuse, or may cause sleep problems and eating disorders
(Neil Schneiderman (2008)). Second, since higher mortgage indebtedness corresponds to
a negative wealth effect, it can lead to fewer health investments, particularly preventative
care.
Mortgage indebtedness can be measured as the ratio of mortgage loan to home value
(LTV). A high LTV means that homeowners have little or no equity in the home value.
In the model, a decline in home prices affects homeowners differently depending on their
level of home equity3. Among homeowners with little or no equity, a decline in home
prices increases LTV, and leads to financial stress and fewer health investments4. Among
homeowners with sizable equity cushions, a decline in home prices increases LTV, but may
not necessarily lead to financial stress or changes in health investments.
Given the potential negative relationship between debt and health, policies that promote
homeownership through financing may have unintended health consequences, especially
when home prices decline sharply. Prior studies on debt and health consider individuals
near or at foreclosure. However, the share of homeowners that default is small compared to
the share of homeowners with mortgage debt outstanding and the negative impact of debt
on health may affect homeowners not in foreclosure. Furthermore, most existing studies use
data that are limited to a specific state or set of states in the U.S. To our knowledge, this is
3The level of home equity is related to housing tenure. New homeowners are more likely to have less
equity compared to seasoned homeowners given the amortizing structure of mortgage loans.
4Empirical evidence for the indirect effect is mixed. Keese and Schmitz (2010) using longitudinal data
for Germany found that individuals with debt are more likely to visit a doctor. Since Germany has universal
health care, the indirect effect of debt on health is likely smaller. Currie and Tekin (2011) using foreclosure
data for four states in the U.S. found that a higher number of foreclosures is associated with more hospital
visits and fewer preventive medical visits.
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the only study to use household mortgage loan to home value to estimate the effect of the
mortgage indebtedness on mental and physical health among a nationally representative
sample of adults over the age of 50 in the U.S.
We show that high mortgage indebtedness is associated with a greater likelihood of
poor health, a decline in well-being, obesity, high blood pressure, and presence of a depres-
sive symptom. However, if mortgage indebtedness and health are endogenous, then OLS
estimates are biased. The endogeneity may be due to reverse causality or that debt and
health are simultaneous determined by a unobserved omitted variable, e.g. ability, health
or wealth endowments, risk tolerance, or time preference. We argue that the recent housing
decline serves as a natural experiment by shifting the level of mortgage indebtedness across
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) over time. We use home prices as an instrument for
the mortgage loan to home value (LTV) ratio in an Instrumental Variable (IV) framework
to identify the causal effect of mortgage debt on health. Among mortgagors, we found that
a 10 percent increase in the probability of high LTV increases the likelihood of a decline
in well-being by 4 percent and the likelihood of a depressive symptom by 3 percent. We
examined whether the results are robust to changes in the estimation sample, redefinition
of the variable of interest (LTV), and the estimation model. Following Currie and Tekin
(2011), we also used the incidence of cancer as a falsification test.
2.2 Literature Review
Defaulting on mortgage debt is a disruptive life event that may negatively affect health. In
the U.S., the rise in foreclosures since 2008 has prompted research on the impact of fore-
closures on health. Pollack and Lynch (2009) compared the health of individuals, recruited
through a mortgage counseling agency, undergoing foreclosure with that of a community
sample from the 2008 Southeastern Pennsylvania Household Health Survey. They found
that the foreclosed sample were significantly more likely to have hypertension, heart dis-
ease, and a clinically diagnosed psychiatric condition than the control group. The foreclosed
also reported greater consumption of smoking and drinking in the past month. In a broader
study covering four states – Arizona, California, Florida, and New Jersey – Currie and Tekin
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(2011) found that zip codes with a greater number of foreclosures also experienced a greater
rise in Emergency Room visits and hospitalizations for stress related conditions, controlling
for county-specific, time-varying factors such as labor market conditions. Furthermore, the
effect was greater among younger individuals and for conditions that are typically avoidable
with preventative care.
Prior to default, borrowers who have missed two or more consecutive payments on the
mortgage loan are considered delinquent. Previous studies have examined the effect of
mortgage debt delinquency on health. For the U.S., Alley et al. (2011), using the 2006 and
2008 waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), compared the health outcomes of
mortgagors who had been more than two months delinquent on their mortgage payments in
the past two years to those who are current on their mortgage payments. They found that
delinquent respondents were significantly more likely to have depressive symptoms and to
have less access to health relevant resources. These results are qualitatively consistent with
similar studies in the U.K. Taylor et al. (2006), using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) from 1991 to 2003, a period that covers the recession in the early nineties, found
that being past due on mortgage debt is associated with a negative psychological effect
among men, controlling for financial conditions and other personal traits. Nettleton and
Burrows (1998), using the Survey of English Housing5 from 1991-1992 and 1994-1995, found
that difficulty meeting mortgage payments is associated with a decline in mental well-being.
Previous studies have also examined the effect of unsecured debt on health. Drentea
and Lavrakas (2000), using a sample of adults in Ohio, found that greater credit card debt-
to-income is associated with a greater likelihood of physical health impairment. In a follow
up study, Drentea (2000) found that greater credit card debt-to-income is associated with
a greater likelihood of having mental anxiety. Similarly, Brown et al. (2005), using the
1995 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), found that greater
unsecured household debt is associated with the likelihood of having poor mental health.
Keese and Schmitz (2010), using the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) from 1999-
2009, found that greater debt is associated with worse mental health and a higher incidence
5The Survey of English Housing is a supplemental survey to the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
consisting of households headed by younger individuals, single parents, single male parents, divorced and
separated, divorced and inactive.
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of obesity. They also estimated a fixed effects model to control for individual-specific, time-
invariant factors that may be endogenous to health and debt. Fixed effects estimates show
that greater indebtedness leads to poor mental health and lower health satisfaction with
mortgage debt having a large effect on mental health. Though, loan amounts of unsecured
debt are typically less than that of mortgage, these findings suggest that even unsecured
debt has a negative effect on health.
Finally, a number of studies have examined the effect of self-reported financial stress
on health. Bridges and Disney (2010) and Skapinakis et al. (2006) found that individuals
experiencing financial difficulties were more likely to exhibit depression. O’Neill et al. (2005)
and Lyons and Yilmazer (2005) found a positive correlation between self-reported financial
stress and poor self-reported health. While these studies show a negative relationship
between financial stress and health, the particular type of debt leading to financial stress
was not identified.
The literature on the health effects of debt has primarily focused the household’s ability
to make debt repayments, that is whether the household is liquidity constrained. Another
measure of a household’s financial condition is the debt to asset ratio, an indicator of
balance sheet leverage. In contrast to prior studies, this study focuses on households with
high mortgage debt to assets but not necessarily delinquent or in default. We argue that
households with a high mortgage loan to home value (LTV) also experience financial stress
given that debt secured by the primary residence comprise the largest share of household
balance sheets. Since the number of homeowners that have experienced a decline in home
equity is larger than the number in delinquency or foreclosure, we argue that the potential
effect of having high LTV on health is relevant to a broader segment of the population6.
2.3 Data
Individual level data on health, housing, financial situation, and other socioeconomic factors
were obtained from the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The
6For example, Alley et al. (2011), using only the HRS 2008 participants eligible to be asked mortgage-
delinquency questions, reported a mortgage delinquency rate of 3 percent whereas, using complete HRS 2008
wave, 13 percent of mortgagors have high LTV.
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HRS is a nationally representative survey of adults over the age of 50 conducted every two
years. Since young adults are more likely to borrow to finance a home purchase, excluding
these individuals is a limitation of the data. On the other hand, older adults are more likely
to be homeowners and less likely to transition in or out of homeownership7.
Six waves of the HRS from 1998 to 2008 were chosen to overlap with the housing boom
and bust cycle and allow for panel estimation. Individuals living in a multifamily home,
nursing home, farm, or ranch were excluded. For the OLS and IV estimations, each wave was
treated as a cross-section to create a pooled dataset with slightly over 80,000 observations.
For the fixed effects estimation, the same dataset, excluding individuals who died between
1998 and 2008, was treated as an unbalanced panel with a little over 19,000 observations.
The HRS housing module contains extensive information on housing-related items such
as homeownership, housing structure, home purchase price, current house price, and housing
debt outstanding. The HRS dataset was merged to an index of house prices by metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). Home price index data was obtained from Freddie Mac8 which pub-
lishes the Freddie Mac House Price Index (FMHPI). The FMHPI is constructed using repeat
transactions on single-family detached or townhome properties which serve as collateral for
mortgage loans purchased by either Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. The FMHPI closely tracks
other constant-quality home prices indices such as Standard and Poor’s Case-Shiller and
Federal Housing Finance Agency.
2.3.1 Variable definitions
Health conditions related to financial stress include self-reported overall well-being, negative
change in overall well-being, obesity, high blood pressure, and presence of a depressive
symptom. HRS measures overall well-being as a categorical variable where 1 indicates
excellent health, 2 indicates very good health, 3 indicates good health, 4 indicates fair
health, and 5 indicates poor health. Poor overall health was constructed as a dichotomous
variable where 1 indicates fair or poor overall health. Decline in health was constructed as
7The participation rate of homeownership stabilizes at around 70 percent after age 45 (Poterba and
Samwick (2001)).
8Freddie Mac is a former government sponsored entity now under a conservatorship directed by the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
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a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates an increase in the self-reported overall well-being
categorical variable. Obesity was constructed as a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates
a body-mass index of 30 or greater. High blood pressure is a self-reported dichotomous
variable where 1 indicates presence of high blood pressure. The HRS measures mental
health with a modified version of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CESD)
scale. The CESD score is the sum of six indicators for the presence of depressive symptoms
(depression, everything is an effort, sleep is restless, felt alone, felt sad, and could not
get going) minus the sum of two indicators for the presence of non-depressive symptoms
(felt happy and enjoyed life). CESD scores range from 1 to 8, with 8 representing those
exhibiting the most depressive symptoms. We converted this measure of depression into a
dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the presence of any depressive symptom. Cancer is
a self-reported dichotomous variable where 1 indicates presence of cancer.
Households experience financial stress when the burden of mortgage indebtedness be-
comes excessive. To measure excessive mortgage indebtedness, we use the loan to value
(LTV) ratio defined as the amount of mortgage loan outstanding divided by the self-reported
home value9. LTV measures the degree of leverage used to finance the primary residence,
which, all else equal, declines over time given the amortizing nature of mortgage loans. If
housing values decline, then home equity is reduced and may even be negative. As well,
homeowners with a high LTV cannot reduce housing consumption accordingly and even if
they manage to sell the home, they are more likely to incur a financial loss due to lower
equity and transaction fees. Therefore, we hypothesize that high LTV, through financial
stress, leads to a greater likelihood of a negative health outcome.
9The Rand version of HRS home value and mortgage debt variables were used instead of the raw HRS
variable since it had fewer missing values. All housing variables refer to the respondent’s primary residence.
A small number of respondents had a LTV that far exceeded average values. LTV was top-coded at their
respective 99 percentile values. An indicator variable was included to adjust for LTV top-coding.
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2.4 Estimation Model
The reduced form model for health as a function of mortgage indebtedness and socioeco-
nomic factors is given by
Hit = α+ λLTV + τt + δmsa + γmsa × t+XitΘ+ ϵit (2.1)
where Hit is a dichotomous indicator for presence of each health condition, λLTV is a
dichotomous indicator for LTV greater than 0.8, τt is an indicator for each wave, δmsa is
an indicator for each MSA, γmsa × t is a MSA-specific linear time trend, Xit is a vector of
socioeconomic variables which includes total non-housing assets, household income, gender,
age, education, race/ethnicity, marital status, labor force status, employment status, blue-
collar worker, and health insurance status for individual i in wave t, and Θ is a vector of
parameters.
The cutoff of 0.8 for high LTV was chosen based on the loan requirement at purchase for
a conventional mortgage. Though loan requirements vary with macroeconomic conditions,
typically mortgage lenders require homebuyers to pay at least 20 percent of the appraised
home value at closing. Therefore, if LTV rises above 80 percent, then the mortgagor expe-
riences a decline in equity, which we hypothesize is a source of financial stress.
Since LTV relates to the value of the primary residence, it is likely correlated with the
individual’s non-housing assets (Flavin and Yamashita (2002)). Total non-housing assets
and household income control for differences due to household portfolio choice10. In ad-
dition, MSA and year fixed effects control for time-invariant differences across MSAs and
year-specific differences in health conditions, respectively. Finally, to ensure that our in-
strument more likely reflects exogenous deviations from long-run trends in home prices by
MSA, we also include MSA-specific linear time trends.
Equation 2.1 was estimated in an IV framework to identify the causal effect of LTV
on health using the Freddie Mac House Price Index (FMHPI) as the instrument. The
FMHPI is a valid instrument because home prices are strongly correlated with LTV, given
10Income and non-housing assets are in units of dollars per thousand.
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that self-reported home value is the denominator of the LTV ratio, but should not directly
affect health except through LTV, which proxies the individual’s level of financial stress11.
Equation 1.1 was estimated in an exactly identified model with the first stage given by:
λLTV = β + κFMHPI
−1
msa,t + τt + δmsa + γmsa × t+XitΘ+ ηit (2.2)
where FMHPI−1msa,t is the inverse of the FMHPI normalized to 1 in year 2000.
The effect of high LTV on health was estimated for the sample population, homeowners,
and mortgagors. Since the sample population contains both renters and homeowners, an
indicator variable for homeowners was included when estimating equations 2.1 and 2.2 using
the sample population. Including an indicator variable for homeowners adjusts for selection
between homeowners and renters and ensures that the parameter on high LTV is only
identified using homeowners’ LTV.
2.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 shows the sample-weighted means for the socioeconomic, health, and housing
finance variables for the sample population, homeowners, and mortgagors. Since the HRS
represents an older sample of the U.S. population, the share of homeowners is larger than
that for overall U.S. population, 78 percent compared to 67.5 percent as of 2008 (Current
Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey (2011)). On average, mortgagors tend to be
healthier than the sample population with lower prevalence of depressive symptoms, high
blood pressure, and cancer. This could be because mortgagors also tend to be younger, 61
versus 65 years. In contrast, the prevalence of obesity is higher among mortgagors. Ta-
ble 2.2 shows the housing finance variables for the sample population, homeowners, and
mortgagors for each wave from 1998 to 2008. Table 2.3 shows health conditions for the
sample population, homeowners, and mortgagors for each wave from 1998 to 2008. Among
mortgagors, the prevalence of obesity and high blood pressure has increased over this pe-
riod while the prevalence of poor health, negative changes in health and cancer remained
relatively stable. Depressive symptoms declined slightly.
11Engelhardt (2003) used home price indices to correct for measurement error in self-reported home values.
They found that self-reported home values are generally overestimated in the range of 10%.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Effect of high LTV on health among mortgagors
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results among mortgagors using OLS for each of the five
health conditions. Errors were adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by MSA. Esti-
mates show that a high LTV is significantly correlated with a greater likelihood of fair/poor
well-being, negative change in well-being, obesity, presence high blood pressure, and pres-
ence of a depressive symptom. The significance and sign of estimates for the remaining
socioeconomic factors vary depending on the health condition. For all five conditions, more
years of schooling, being in the labor force, and greater non-housing assets are associated
with a lower likelihood of poor health conditions.
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results among mortgagors using IV for each of the five
health conditions. The IV estimates are positive but magnitudes are roughly larger by a
factor of 10. Only the estimate on likelihood of a negative change in well-being remains
statistically significant at the 95 percent level. IV and OLS estimates for a negative change
in well-being are 0.402 and 0.0282, respectively. This implies that OLS estimates are biased
towards zero.
We consider several potential omitted variables. Individuals who are less patient, more
risk loving, or have a low health endowment are more likely to have a high LTV. However,
these individuals are also more likely to be in poor health suggesting that OLS estimates
will be biased away from zero. The only way for OLS estimates to be biased towards zero
is if the omitted variable is positively correlated with high LTV and negatively correlated
with poor health or vice versa. We hypothesize that the omitted variable could be ability
or wealth endowment. Individuals who have a high ability or a high wealth endowment are
less likely to be credit constrained, more likely to qualify for a high LTV, and less likely to
be in poor health. This could explain why OLS estimates are biased towards zero.
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2.5.2 Robustness Checks
We examine whether the results are robust to changes in the estimation sample, redefinition
of the variable of interest (LTV), and the estimation model. The estimation sample was
increased to include homeowners with no mortgages and renters, both groups with LTV
equal to zero. As well, the sample was reduced to exclude individuals age 65 and above
to ensure that the results are not driven by this age group. We also estimated the effect
of low LTV on the same health conditions expecting that the estimated effect would be
either insignificant or negative. Following Currie and Tekin (2011), we used the incidence
of cancer as a falsification test. Finally, we considered an alternative estimation model with
an unobserved, individual specific, time-invariant omitted variable.
Effect of high LTV on health by homeownership-status
Although the main finding relates to mortgagors, it is also of interest to examine the effect
among the sample population and homeowners. And since previous studies have found
that debt affects mental health in particular, the eight symptoms that comprise the CESD
measure were separately examined as outcome variables. Table 2.6 shows the effect of
high LTV on the five health conditions and eight depressive symptoms among the sample
population, homeowners, and mortgagors.
Among mortgagors, the OLS and IV estimates are positive for each of the depressive
symptoms and significant at the 95 percent level for restless sleep, did not enjoy life, and
hard to get going. In the sample of homeowners, homeowners with no mortgages are added
to the sample of mortgagors. This more than doubles the sample size and should increase the
power of the t-test. However, the adjusted errors among homeowners are roughly the same
as that for mortgagors. This suggests that the heterogeneity of renters and homeowners
with no mortgages contribute to the error term and does not improve the power. In the
sample population, renters are added to the sample of homeowners increasing the sample
by over 20,000 observations. The IV estimates for presence of depressive symptom and felt
alone are significant at the 95 percent level.
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Effect of low LTV on health
We estimated the effect of low LTV, defined as an LTV of 40 percent or less, on the likelihood
of each health condition. Mortgagors with low LTV should not experience financial stress as
these homeowners have sizable home equity. Table 2.7 shows that the estimated effect of low
LTV is negative and significant for outcomes using OLS. Among mortgagors, the estimated
effect of low LTV is negative and significant for a decline in well-being, not enjoying life,
and difficulty getting going.
Fixed Effects
We consider an estimation model with an unobserved, individual specific, time-invariant
omitted variable. The fixed effects model is given by
Hit = α+ λLTV + ωi + τt +XitΘ+ ϵit (2.3)
where ωi is a dichotomous indicator for each individual, Xit is a vector of time-varying
socioeconomic variables which includes total non-housing assets, household income, age,
marital status, labor force status, employment status, blue-collar worker, and health insur-
ance status for individual i in wave t, and Θ is a vector of parameters.
Tables 2.8 shows the effect of high LTV on the likelihood of each condition using fixed
effects estimation. A 10 percent increase in the likelihood of having high LTV increases the
likelihood of being in fair/poor health and having a negative change in health by 15 and 19
percent among the sample population and homeowners, respectively. Among mortgagors,
the estimate is not significant but since the adjusted error is roughly the same as for the
other two groups, this lack of significance is likely due to lack of power. Interestingly, while
the IV estimates suggest that high LTV affects health through mental stress, fixed effects
estimates do not show a significant effect on incidence of depressive symptoms.
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Cancer as a control outcome
Following Currie and Tekin (2011), we used cancer as a “control” outcome. Assuming that
financial stress does not cause cancer, then high LTV should have no effect on presence of
cancer. Table 2.9 shows that high LTV does not have a significant effect on the likelihood
of cancer neither among mortgagors, homeowners, nor the sample population.
Sub-sample by age
Finally, the effect of high LTV was estimated on a restricted sample of individuals less than
65 years old to ensure that our results are not driven by individuals age 65 and over. The
sample of mortgagors is reduced to 17,131 from 18,222 observations. The sample population
is reduced to 27,705 from 61,607 and the sample of homeowners is reduced to 34,560 from
80,036. The results for the sample restricted by age are qualitatively consistent with the
unrestricted sample.
2.6 Discussion
High LTV is significantly correlated with poor self-reported well-being, a decline in well-
being, obesity, high blood pressure, and presence of a depressive symptom. High LTV is
not significantly correlated with cancer suggesting that these findings are not an artifact of
the data. Though the estimates of IV are larger in magnitude relative to OLS, the adjusted
errors are also larger, such that only decline in well-being and presence of a depressive
symptoms such as restless sleep, did not enjoy life, and hard to get going remain statistically
significant.
We compared the effect of high LTV with that of mortgage delinquencies from Alley et al.
(2011) and foreclosures from Currie and Tekin (2011) on health in the U.S. Although, Alley
et al. (2011) used the same dataset, they used a subsample of homeowners who responded to
an internet-based questionnaire which specifically asked mortgage delinquency status.Alley
et al. (2011) estimated the log odds of a major decline in self-reported health to be 1.17
and of a depressive symptom to be 7.86. Converting from odds ratios and assuming a
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probability of delinquency of 3 percent12, the predicted probabilities for a decline in health
and depressive symptom is 1.67 and 2.73 percent, respectively.
Currie and Tekin (2011) estimated the effect of foreclosure on the number of hospitaliza-
tion and ER visits related to hypertension and anxiety to be 0.0055 and 0.025, respectively,
among those age 50-64. The average number of foreclosures per zip code between 2005 and
2009 was 84. This corresponds to a 7.39 percent increase in the number of hospitaliza-
tion and ER visits related to hypertension and a 15.85 percent increase in visits related to
anxiety.
According to Table 2.2, between 2006-2008, the prevalence of high LTV increased by
30 percent. This corresponds to an estimated increase of 6.33 percent in the likelihood
of high blood pressure and 9.6 percent in the likelihood of a depressive symptom among
mortgagors.
Estimates for all three studies are summarized in Table 2.11. The predicted change in
outcome using high LTV is comparable with that using number of foreclosures. However,
the predicted change using mortgage delinquency is lower than expected. This could be due
to our incorrectly calculating the change in delinquency prevalence rate or to the difference
in the estimation sample.
A limitation of this study is that HRS data only surveys people over 50 years of age.
Since Currie and Tekin (2011) found the most pronounced effects on those between 20 and
49 years of age, the effect of high LTV could be larger for a younger cohort. On the other
hand, since younger homeowners have more time to recoup losses in home equity, the effect
on health may be smaller. An area for further research would be to use a dataset with
younger homeowners.
From a policy perspective, our results highlight the unintended health consequences
of promoting financing for home purchases, especially when home prices are subject to
volatility. Innovations in the mortgage loan market have allowed high leverage and frequent
refinancing. At the same time labor markets are characterized by less stability, with shorter
tenures at the same firm and more frequent unemployment spells. Policymakers should
12Alley et al. (2011) did not report the weighted-mean prevalence of mortgage delinquency in the sample,
only the number of observations. We calculated the delinquency rate based on the reported number of
observations.
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consider whether the benefits of homeownership outweigh the negative health effects of
high mortgage indebtedness.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics (HRS 1998-2008 pooled)
All Homeowners Mortgagors
homeowner 0.78 1.00 1.00
mortgagor 0.36 0.46 1.00
female 0.55 0.53 0.50
age 65.89 65.26 60.89
years of schooling 12.79 13.15 13.67
black 0.10 0.08 0.09
hispanic 0.07 0.06 0.06
other 0.04 0.04 0.05
married 0.64 0.73 0.78
in labor force 0.44 0.48 0.66
unemployed 0.01 0.01 0.01
has health insurance 0.84 0.84 0.79
blue-collar 0.50 0.45 0.38
household income 70,757.51 79,868.59 95,344.69
non-housing assets 325,975.64 393,406.98 316,221.91
mortgage loan 35,975.02 46,153.61 100,458.58
house value 188,206.94 239,472.00 274,344.97
LTV 0.16 0.21 0.45
high LTV 0.04 0.05 0.11
low LTV 0.81 0.76 0.47
poor health 0.26 0.22 0.19
negative change in health 0.25 0.23 0.21
obesity 0.26 0.25 0.29
high blood pressure 0.50 0.48 0.45
depressive symptoms 0.55 0.51 0.49
cancer 0.13 0.13 0.10
observations 80,088 61,638 26,233
Sample-weighted means.
Mortgage loans on primary residence.
High LTV defined as LTV > 0.80. Low LTV defined as LTV <= 0.40.
Obesity defined as BMI>30. Depressive symptoms defined as CESD>0.
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Table 2.2: Homeownership and mortgage indebtedness time trends, 1998-2008.
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
All
LTV 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17
high LTV 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
low LTV 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.81
Freddie Mac Home Price Index 87.75 100.00 116.57 143.01 160.93 133.44
homeowners 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
mortgagors 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.36
Homeowners
LTV 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.21
high LTV 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
low LTV 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.73 0.76 0.76
Freddie Mac Home Price Index 87.88 100.00 116.25 142.08 159.49 132.41
Mortgagors
LTV 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.46
high LTV 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13
low LTV 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.48
Freddie Mac Home Price Index 87.23 100.00 117.44 145.06 163.79 132.70
observations 14,764 13,668 12,698 14,264 12,684 12,010
Sample-weighted shares except for LTV and Freddie Mac Home Price Index
which are sample-weighted means.
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Table 2.3: Health conditions time trends, 1998-2008.
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
All
poor health 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27
negative change in health 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26
obesity 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30
high blood pressure 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.57
depressive symptoms 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52
cancer 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.15
Homeowners
poor health 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
negative change in health 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23
obesity 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.29
high blood pressure 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.55
depressive symptoms 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.48
cancer 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.15
Mortgagors
poor health 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20
negative change in health 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.21
obesity 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.34
high blood pressure 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.47 0.52
depressive symptoms 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.46
cancer 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.12
observations 14,764 13,668 12,698 14,264 12,684 12,010
Sample-weighted means.
Obesity defined as BMI>30. Depressive symptoms defined as CESD>0.
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Table 2.4: OLS: Effect of high LTV on the likelihood of each condition among mortgagors.
Mortgagors
poor health neg chg in health obesity high blood pressure depressive symptoms
high LTV 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗
(0.00894) (0.0100) (0.0129) (0.0111) (0.0125)
female -0.0266∗∗∗ -0.00100 -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗
(0.00808) (0.00692) (0.00874) (0.0109) (0.00788)
age -0.00292 -0.0132∗∗∗ 0.00963∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗ -0.00988∗
(0.00398) (0.00397) (0.00450) (0.00470) (0.00555)
age squared/100 0.00266 0.0121∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.0220∗∗∗ 0.00637
(0.00333) (0.00326) (0.00339) (0.00358) (0.00442)
years of schooling -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.00523∗∗∗ -0.00898∗∗∗ -0.00504∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗
(0.00149) (0.00143) (0.00175) (0.00191) (0.00207)
black 0.0495∗∗∗ -0.0344∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.00926) (0.0148) (0.0163) (0.0128)
hispanic 0.0524∗∗∗ -0.00842 0.0137 -0.0225 0.00425
(0.0139) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0164) (0.0258)
other 0.0329∗ -0.00237 -0.0409 0.0284 0.0537∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0271) (0.0183) (0.0216)
married -0.0249∗∗ 0.000529 -0.0224∗ 0.000299 -0.0914∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.00755) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0107)
labor -0.177∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗ -0.0614∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.00946) (0.00846) (0.0104) (0.00902) (0.00940)
unemployed 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0585 0.0308 0.0701∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0355) (0.0315) (0.0289) (0.0329)
insured 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗ 0.0119 0.0278∗∗ 0.00959
(0.00739) (0.00651) (0.0101) (0.0114) (0.00966)
blue collar 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.00510 -0.00565 -0.00768 0.0537∗∗∗
(0.00839) (0.00832) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0109)
income/1000 -0.0000513 0.00000812 -0.0000518 -0.0000584∗∗ -0.0000677∗
(0.0000347) (0.0000266) (0.0000457) (0.0000292) (0.0000352)
non-housing assets/1000 -0.00000941∗∗∗ -0.00000606∗ -0.0000118∗∗∗ -0.0000150∗∗∗ -0.0000127∗∗∗
(0.00000290) (0.00000351) (0.00000325) (0.00000421) (0.00000350)
Observations 26222 23105 25857 26218 24487
R2 0.149 0.059 0.069 0.115 0.091
All specifications include year indicators, MSA indicators, and MSA-specific linear trends.
Robust errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
High LTV defined as LTV > 0.80.
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Table 2.5: IV: Effect of high LTV on the likelihood of each condition among mortgagors.
Mortgagors
poor health neg chg in health obesity high blood pressure depressive symptoms
high LTV 0.306 0.402∗ 0.131 0.211 0.320
(0.207) (0.231) (0.239) (0.215) (0.244)
female -0.0256∗∗∗ 0.000650 -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗
(0.00805) (0.00685) (0.00880) (0.0106) (0.00786)
age -0.000316 -0.00890∗∗ 0.0105∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗ -0.00708
(0.00430) (0.00420) (0.00527) (0.00500) (0.00621)
age squared/100 0.00106 0.00936∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0232∗∗∗ 0.00459
(0.00338) (0.00318) (0.00376) (0.00371) (0.00476)
years of schooling -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.00330∗ -0.00861∗∗∗ -0.00416∗∗ -0.0150∗∗∗
(0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00218) (0.00201) (0.00236)
black 0.0309 -0.0612∗∗∗ 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.0266
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0228) (0.0207) (0.0208)
hispanic 0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0147 0.0120 -0.0259∗ -0.000761
(0.0150) (0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0156) (0.0261)
other 0.0262 -0.0121 -0.0429 0.0235 0.0472∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0292) (0.0188) (0.0216)
married -0.0192 0.00920 -0.0206 0.00430 -0.0854∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.00899) (0.0140) (0.0122) (0.0118)
labor -0.179∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0629∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00867) (0.0106) (0.00862) (0.00930)
unemployed 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.0559 0.0289 0.0665∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0368) (0.0316) (0.0296) (0.0350)
insured 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0123 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0105
(0.00729) (0.00697) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.00970)
blue collar 0.0275∗∗∗ -0.00181 -0.00716 -0.0111 0.0486∗∗∗
(0.00857) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0116)
income/1000 -0.0000451 0.0000175 -0.0000499 -0.0000540∗ -0.0000630∗∗
(0.0000305) (0.0000214) (0.0000450) (0.0000280) (0.0000317)
non-housing assets/1000 -0.00000698∗∗ -0.00000278 -0.0000111∗∗∗ -0.0000133∗∗∗ -0.0000102∗∗∗
(0.00000342) (0.00000397) (0.00000359) (0.00000445) (0.00000388)
Observations 26222 23105 25857 26218 24487
R2 0.114 . 0.067 0.103 0.067
First-stage F-stat 22.42 14.78 21.35 22.30 21.03
All specifications include year indicators, MSA indicators, and MSA-specific linear trends.
Robust errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
High LTV defined as LTV > 0.80.
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Table 2.6: Effect of high LTV on the likelihood of each condition.
All Homeowners Mortgagors
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
poor health 0.0559*** 0.1319 0.0594*** 0.0428 0.0514*** 0.3056
(0.00837) (0.25173) (0.00839) (0.25975) (0.00894) (0.20684)
neg chg in health 0.0345*** 0.2327 0.0361*** 0.1425 0.0282** 0.4021*
(0.00968) (0.38378) (0.00998) (0.32797) (0.01002) (0.23114)
obesity 0.0710*** -0.0395 0.0696*** -0.1594 0.0524*** 0.1310
(0.01308) (0.25744) (0.01348) (0.24223) (0.01289) (0.23924)
high blood pressure 0.0396*** 0.4738 0.0400*** 0.3367 0.0263** 0.2106
(0.01094) (0.32306) (0.01131) (0.26898) (0.01113) (0.21470)
depressive symptoms 0.0677*** 0.8575* 0.0726*** 0.1402 0.0653*** 0.3202
(0.01229) (0.49481) (0.01199) (0.35587) (0.01247) (0.24377)
depressed 0.0368*** 0.2341 0.0404*** 0.0671 0.0315*** 0.1298
(0.00963) (0.28668) (0.00975) (0.23741) (0.00972) (0.18049)
everything is an effort 0.0527*** 0.1257 0.0590*** -0.0155 0.0568*** 0.1818
(0.01233) (0.36052) (0.01217) (0.32565) (0.01215) (0.27875)
restless sleep 0.0449*** 0.3164 0.0479*** 0.0278 0.0442*** 0.3942*
(0.01122) (0.38154) (0.01140) (0.31236) (0.01142) (0.23016)
felt unhappy 0.0264*** 0.1726 0.0296*** -0.0532 0.0241*** 0.2409
(0.00741) (0.26904) (0.00740) (0.22441) (0.00684) (0.18100)
felt alone 0.0138* 0.4970* 0.0177** 0.2041 0.0139* 0.0490
(0.00688) (0.28114) (0.00684) (0.21564) (0.00705) (0.15131)
did not enjoy life 0.0172*** 0.3251 0.0185*** 0.1709 0.0190*** 0.2747**
(0.00589) (0.22751) (0.00583) (0.18921) (0.00565) (0.13161)
felt sad 0.0385*** 0.2726 0.0413*** -0.1262 0.0347*** -0.0898
(0.00907) (0.36387) (0.00924) (0.28771) (0.00993) (0.24880)
hard to get going 0.0316*** 0.0549 0.0347*** -0.2261 0.0267*** 0.5676**
(0.00867) (0.40722) (0.00847) (0.29487) (0.00867) (0.23710)
All specifications include controls for gender, age, age-squared/100, education, race/ethnicity,
marital status, labor force status, income/1000, non-housing assets/1000, and health insurance status.
All specifications include year indicators, MSA indicators, and MSA-specific linear trends.
Robust errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
High LTV defined as LTV > 0.80.
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Table 2.7: Effect of low LTV on the likelihood of each condition.
All Homeowners Mortgagors
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
poor health -0.0290*** -0.0926 -0.0331*** -0.0294 -0.0235*** -0.2013
(0.00532) (0.17046) (0.00525) (0.17667) (0.00681) (0.12563)
neg chg in health -0.0267*** -0.1511 -0.0286*** -0.0898 -0.0224*** -0.2328*
(0.00490) (0.24639) (0.00502) (0.21021) (0.00669) (0.14100)
obesity -0.0528*** 0.0274 -0.0542*** 0.1095 -0.0421*** -0.0836
(0.00850) (0.17959) (0.00882) (0.17498) (0.00940) (0.14506)
high blood pressure -0.0409*** -0.3313* -0.0439*** -0.2305 -0.0376*** -0.1378
(0.00764) (0.20099) (0.00813) (0.17080) (0.00849) (0.13177)
depressive symptoms -0.0257*** -0.5936* -0.0320*** -0.0950 -0.0254*** -0.2046
(0.00701) (0.32360) (0.00657) (0.23617) (0.00858) (0.15990)
depressed -0.0239*** -0.1592 -0.0270*** -0.0449 -0.0197*** -0.0827
(0.00439) (0.18732) (0.00472) (0.15780) (0.00562) (0.11531)
everything is an effort -0.0192*** -0.0861 -0.0248*** 0.0104 -0.0213*** -0.1165
(0.00588) (0.24267) (0.00594) (0.21981) (0.00619) (0.17253)
restless sleep -0.0231*** -0.2148 -0.0274*** -0.0186 -0.0260*** -0.2510
(0.00510) (0.24378) (0.00502) (0.20748) (0.00615) (0.15594)
felt unhappy -0.0199*** -0.1179 -0.0238*** 0.0358 -0.0216*** -0.1538
(0.00419) (0.18208) (0.00444) (0.15137) (0.00508) (0.10689)
felt alone -0.0131*** -0.3385 -0.0161*** -0.1370 -0.0117** -0.0313
(0.00416) (0.20700) (0.00381) (0.15650) (0.00429) (0.09873)
did not enjoy life -0.0079** -0.2225 -0.0097*** -0.1147 -0.0100*** -0.1753*
(0.00315) (0.16977) (0.00300) (0.12917) (0.00308) (0.10316)
felt sad -0.0259*** -0.1855 -0.0299*** 0.0844 -0.0270*** 0.0570
(0.00418) (0.24372) (0.00461) (0.19298) (0.00594) (0.15986)
hard to get going -0.0202*** -0.0373 -0.0242*** 0.1508 -0.0155** -0.3601*
(0.00466) (0.27497) (0.00448) (0.20525) (0.00594) (0.18877)
All specifications include controls for gender, age, age-squared/100, education, race/ethnicity,
marital status, labor force status, income/1000, non-housing assets/1000, and health insurance status.
All specifications include year indicators, MSA indicators, and MSA-specific linear trends.
Robust errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Low LTV defined as LTV <= 0.4.
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Table 2.8: Fixed Effects: Effect of high LTV on the likelihood of each condition.
All Homeowners Mortgagors
poor health 0.0151* 0.0188** 0.0127
(0.00803) (0.00834) (0.00885)
neg chg in health 0.0086 0.0099 0.0070
(0.01068) (0.01127) (0.01212)
obesity -0.0032 -0.0048 -0.0049
(0.00670) (0.00712) (0.00752)
high blood pressure -0.0070 -0.0066 -0.0057
(0.00686) (0.00724) (0.00756)
depressive symptoms 0.0129 0.0077 -0.0016
(0.01041) (0.01102) (0.01167)
depressed -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0050
(0.00819) (0.00862) (0.00911)
everything is an effort 0.0156 0.0133 0.0122
(0.00898) (0.00945) (0.00990)
restless sleep 0.0129 0.0175 0.0120
(0.01006) (0.01062) (0.01120)
felt unhappy -0.0064 -0.0021 -0.0052
(0.00792) (0.00815) (0.00862)
felt alone -0.0058 -0.0087 -0.0105
(0.00782) (0.00818) (0.00882)
did not enjoy life -0.0022 0.0015 -0.0017
(0.00625) (0.00656) (0.00702)
felt sad -0.0097 -0.0086 -0.0087
(0.00891) (0.00946) (0.01014)
hard to get going -0.0163* -0.0221** -0.0271**
(0.00904) (0.00943) (0.00984)
All specifications include controls for age, marital status, labor force status,
income/1000, non-housing assets/1000, and health insurance status.
All specifications include year indicators.
Robust errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
High LTV defined as LTV > 0.80.
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Table 2.9: Effect of high LTV on the likelihood of cancer.
All Homeowners Mortgagors
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
high LTV -0.00978 0.239 -0.00609 0.149 -0.00658 0.0817
(0.00731) (0.196) (0.00708) (0.151) (0.00682) (0.115)
homeowner 0.00223 -0.0107
(0.00582) (0.0110)
female -0.00989∗ -0.00921∗ -0.0104∗ -0.00952 0.00718 0.00753
(0.00535) (0.00520) (0.00607) (0.00586) (0.00622) (0.00613)
age 0.00750∗∗∗ 0.00937∗∗∗ 0.00883∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.00403 0.00493
(0.00176) (0.00214) (0.00224) (0.00266) (0.00334) (0.00331)
age squared/100 -0.00283∗∗ -0.00392∗∗∗ -0.00342∗∗ -0.00419∗∗ 0.000180 -0.000381
(0.00132) (0.00148) (0.00169) (0.00187) (0.00275) (0.00272)
years of schooling 0.00234∗∗ 0.00257∗∗ 0.00170 0.00191 0.000673 0.00110
(0.00107) (0.00110) (0.00125) (0.00129) (0.00179) (0.00174)
black -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0358∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗ -0.0390∗∗∗ -0.0369∗∗∗ -0.0434∗∗∗
(0.00586) (0.00816) (0.00721) (0.00922) (0.00913) (0.0119)
hispanic -0.0378∗∗∗ -0.0401∗∗∗ -0.0369∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0349∗∗ -0.0365∗∗
(0.00778) (0.00890) (0.0101) (0.0109) (0.0143) (0.0153)
other -0.0116 -0.0147∗ -0.0143 -0.0169 -0.00711 -0.00943
(0.00837) (0.00833) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0138) (0.0139)
married -0.00192 -0.000593 -0.000632 0.000563 -0.00268 -0.000725
(0.00538) (0.00525) (0.00627) (0.00619) (0.00930) (0.00971)
labor -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.0406∗∗∗ -0.0344∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0395∗∗∗
(0.00439) (0.00572) (0.00513) (0.00591) (0.00673) (0.00690)
unemployed 0.0127 0.0127 0.0151 0.0130 0.0123 0.0106
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0178) (0.0173)
insured 0.00538 0.00555 0.00190 0.00213 0.00931 0.00979
(0.00521) (0.00526) (0.00568) (0.00567) (0.00655) (0.00666)
blue collar -0.00961∗ -0.0110∗ -0.0152∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.00799 -0.00965
(0.00578) (0.00569) (0.00605) (0.00596) (0.00752) (0.00781)
income/1000 -0.00000347 -0.00000350 -0.00000559 -0.00000493 -0.00000389 -0.00000175
(0.00000224) (0.00000256) (0.00000561) (0.00000625) (0.00000850) (0.00000834)
non-housing assets/1000 0.00000220∗∗ 0.00000296∗∗∗ 0.00000218∗∗ 0.00000260∗∗ -0.000000306 0.000000537
(0.00000106) (0.00000111) (0.00000102) (0.00000103) (0.00000254) (0.00000266)
Observations 80051 80051 61610 61610 26227 26227
R2 0.045 0.027 0.049 0.040 0.065 0.058
First-stage F-stat 27.44 24.32 22.51
All specifications include year indicators, MSA indicators, and MSA-specific linear trends.
Robust errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
High LTV defined as LTV > 0.80.
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Table 2.10: Effect of high LTV on the likelihood of each condition among individuals less
than 65 years old.
All Homeowners Mortgagors
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
poor health 0.0556*** 0.0469 0.0549*** -0.1496 0.0496*** 0.0972
(0.00977) (0.27352) (0.00990) (0.26300) (0.01089) (0.22943)
neg chg in health 0.0395*** 0.2261 0.0390*** 0.0353 0.0361** 0.3383
(0.01324) (0.34926) (0.01324) (0.31675) (0.01409) (0.21206)
obesity 0.0808*** 0.1364 0.0781*** 0.2038 0.0654*** 0.1459
(0.01522) (0.24515) (0.01530) (0.22509) (0.01552) (0.26114)
high blood pressure 0.0507*** 0.2566 0.0484*** 0.0422 0.0410** 0.0285
(0.01582) (0.32845) (0.01602) (0.27576) (0.01529) (0.24329)
depressive symptoms 0.0659*** 0.4691 0.0673*** -0.0287 0.0651*** 0.4106
(0.01481) (0.37198) (0.01485) (0.29952) (0.01456) (0.27315)
depressed 0.0295** 0.2082 0.0297** 0.1298 0.0268** 0.2456
(0.01129) (0.25056) (0.01136) (0.19139) (0.01156) (0.20168)
everything is an effort 0.0476*** 0.6391* 0.0497*** 0.2885 0.0549*** 0.3477
(0.01303) (0.35051) (0.01292) (0.29413) (0.01262) (0.28883)
restless sleep 0.0481*** 0.0102 0.0482*** -0.0793 0.0428*** 0.3284
(0.01335) (0.31820) (0.01351) (0.28177) (0.01305) (0.26531)
felt unhappy 0.0332*** 0.1121 0.0335*** -0.0185 0.0296*** 0.2551
(0.00957) (0.25009) (0.00962) (0.20634) (0.00916) (0.19306)
felt alone 0.0182** 0.3645 0.0191** 0.1971 0.0155* 0.1933
(0.00841) (0.30866) (0.00850) (0.22752) (0.00859) (0.18694)
did not enjoy life 0.0176** 0.3695* 0.0161* 0.3317* 0.0168** 0.3558*
(0.00778) (0.20148) (0.00769) (0.18352) (0.00751) (0.19104)
felt sad 0.0467*** -0.0843 0.0464*** -0.1307 0.0430*** -0.0990
(0.01133) (0.33987) (0.01146) (0.30199) (0.01241) (0.26768)
hard to get going 0.0309*** 0.2253 0.0303*** 0.1149 0.0272** 0.5121**
(0.00928) (0.26897) (0.00933) (0.21609) (0.00977) (0.22528)
All specifications include controls for gender, age, age-squared/100, education, race/ethnicity,
marital status, labor force status, income/1000, non-housing assets/1000, and health insurance status.
All specifications include year indicators, MSA indicators, and MSA-specific linear trends.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 Mortgage debt, unemployment and health
Catherine Lau and Leigh Ann Leung
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Abstract
We looked at the effect of high mortgage debt interacted with unemployment on health
using the NLSY79, a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women
who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. This study expands on our
previous work (Lau and Leung (2012)) in which we explored the effect of mortgage debt on
health using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Results show that high mortgage
loan to value is not significantly correlated with most measures of poor health but when
interacted with unemployment is positively and significantly correlated with poor health.
The interaction increases the probability that a respondent will report being in poor health
by close to 1%. We employ temporal ordering estimation to test whether past periods of
unemployment and high LTV are also significantly correlated with current poor health. The
OLS results might be a result of reverse causality, with poor health leading to higher debt.
We cannot rule out reverse causality given that those in poor health in one survey have a
significant likelihood of having high LTV in the next survey (two years later).
Author Keywords: Homeownership, mortgage debt, unemployment, health, temporal or-
dering
JEL classification codes: I18
3.1 Introduction
Previous studies have found that unemployment leads to poor health and higher mortality.
Different hypotheses have been proposed to explain this relationship. One hypothesis is
that unemployment leads to a decline in social status which negatively affects health. An-
other hypothesis suggests that unemployment affects health directly through increase stress.
An indirect path in attributes the decline in health to lower lifetime income by reducing
investment in medical care. This study examines the effect through financial stress. We hy-
pothesize that if unemployment affects health through stress, the effect will be particularly
acute for homeowners with mortgages. To our knowledge, this is the first study to exam-
ine the effect the health consequences of the interaction of unemployment and mortgage
indebtedness.
We focus on mortgage debt for two main reasons. Firstly, home mortgages constitute a
large share of household liabilities, since home purchases require a great deal more capital
than households typically have on hand, necessitating financing of the majority of home
sales. Secondly, U.S. policy encourages homeownership but little is understood about the
ramifications of the concomitant debt. In fact, the government’s subsidy of mortgage financ-
ing1 encourages leverage over equity in home purchases and greater consumption of housing
than households would have chosen if these subsidies did not exist (Glaeser and Shapiro
(2003)). In 2008, 93 percent of homes purchased involved financing, though in 2010, this
declined to 91 percent (Hale (2009, 2010)). The degree of house financing is also affected
by the interaction between policy and economic conditions. During periods of mortgage
credit expansion, riskier homebuyers can also qualify for mortgages, thereby increasing the
prevalence of mortgage finance in home sales (Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2010)).
Since capital gains on homes are not subject to taxes if invested in a more expensive home,
sellers in rising price markets are encouraged to invest all their profit back into real estate,
distorting demand for expensive homes.
While homeownership in general leads to positive social outcomes, mortgage indebted-
1The cost of borrowing is subsidized by allowing interest paid on mortgages to be deducted from income
(Rosen (1985)) and through government guarantees which reduce the credit risk of mortgage loans, essentially
lowering the interest rate.
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ness potentially leads to negative health outcomes. We use Grossman’s (1972) model of
health as a stock variable, which depreciates over time but can be augmented by combining
time, income, and medical care, to illustrate the potential negative impact of mortgage in-
debtedness on health. We hypothesize a direct and an indirect path through which mortgage
indebtedness leads to poor health. First, higher mortgage indebtedness increases financial
stress. Epidemiological studies have found that stress plays a role in cardiovascular disease
(Dorian and Taylor (1984)). Previous studies have also found that stress affects both the
contraction of and progression of certain diseases (Calcagni and Elenkov (2006), Contrada
and Baum (2009)), and in particular stress can increase the probability of catching a cold
(Takkouche et al. (2001)). Financial stress can also lead to unhealthy behaviors such as
drinking, smoking, or substance abuse, or may cause sleep problems and eating disorders
(Neil Schneiderman (2008)). Second, since higher mortgage indebtedness corresponds to
a negative wealth effect, it can lead to fewer health investments, particularly preventative
care investments.
Mortgage indebtedness can be measured as the ratio of mortgage loan to home value
(LTV). A high LTV means that homeowners have little to no equity in their home2. High
LTV may lead to financial stress and fewer health investments3. Among homeowners with
sizable equity cushions, a decline in home prices increases LTV, but may not necessarily
lead to financial stress or changes in health investments.
Given the potential negative relationship between debt and health, policies that promote
homeownership through financing may have unintended health consequences, especially in
times of readily available credit, when little to no equity may be required. Prior studies
on debt and health consider individuals near or at foreclosure. However, the share of
homeowners that default is small compared to the share of homeowners with mortgage
debt outstanding and the negative impact of debt on health may affect homeowners not
in foreclosure. Furthermore, most existing studies use data that are limited to a specific
2The level of home equity is related to housing tenure. New homeowners are more likely to have less
equity compared to seasoned homeowners given the amortizing structure of mortgage loans.
3Empirical evidence for the indirect effect is mixed. Keese and Schmitz (2010) using longitudinal data
for Germany found that individuals with debt are more likely to visit a doctor. Since Germany has universal
health care, the indirect effect of debt on health is likely smaller. Currie and Tekin (2011) using foreclosure
data for four states in the U.S. found that a higher number of foreclosures is associated with more hospital
visits and fewer preventive medical visits.
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state or set of states in the U.S. To our knowledge, this is the only study to use household
mortgage loan to home value to estimate the effect of the mortgage indebtedness on mental
and physical health among a nationally representative sample of adults.
The form of housing debt most prevalent in the United States is the 30-year fixed rate
mortgage, which was designed in a period when average job tenure was longer. Average job
tenure for men in the 45 to 54 age group, which corresponds to the age group of this study,
declined from 10.1% to 8.1% in the decade from 1996 to 2006 (Baluja et al. (2003)). We
feel that periods of unemployment combined with high mortgage debt can be stressful and
negatively affect health.
The contribution of this paper compared to our study using HRS is that we can estimate
the effect of mortgage debt on a cohort that is more likely to rely on wage income, less likely
to rely on retirement income, and also have lower net worth. A younger cohort will also allow
us to examine whether having stable income can mitigate the financial stress associated with
mortgage indebtedness. We are testing dual hypotheses: 1) that those with more stable
income should experience less stress; and 2) that those with high mortgage debt who are
involuntarily unemployed experience even greater stress. Previous studies have shown that
unemployment increases mortality. We will review and summarize the literature on this
topic and examine the effect of the interaction between unemployment and mortgage debt
on health outcomes. We expect that unemployment also compounds the negative health
effect of mortgage debt. to our knowledge, this paper is the first to recognize that neither
unemployment nor debt alone may have a significant adverse impact on health, but rather
the presence of the two variables simultaneously leads to stress and worse health outcomes.
3.2 Literature Review
Defaulting on mortgage debt is a disruptive life event that may negatively affect health. In
the U.S., the rise in foreclosures since 2008 has prompted research on the impact of fore-
closures on health. Pollack and Lynch (2009) compared the health of individuals, recruited
through a mortgage counseling agency, undergoing foreclosure with that of a community
sample from the 2008 Southeastern Pennsylvania Household Health Survey. They found
57
that the foreclosed sample were significantly more likely to have hypertension, heart dis-
ease, and a clinically diagnosed psychiatric condition than the control group. The foreclosed
also reported greater consumption of smoking and drinking in the past month. In a broader
study covering four states – Arizona, California, Florida, and New Jersey – Currie and Tekin
(2011) found that zip codes with a greater number of foreclosures also experienced a greater
rise in Emergency Room visits and hospitalizations for stress related conditions, controlling
for county-specific, time-varying factors such as labor market conditions. Furthermore, the
effect was greater among younger individuals and for conditions that are typically avoidable
with preventative care.
Prior to default, borrowers who have missed two or more consecutive payments on a
mortgage loan are considered delinquent. Previous studies have examined the effect of
mortgage debt delinquency on health. For the U.S., Alley et al. (2011), using the 2006 and
2008 waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), compared the health outcomes of
mortgagors who had been more than two months delinquent on their mortgage payments in
the past two years to those who are current on their mortgage payments. They found that
delinquent respondents were significantly more likely to have depressive symptoms and to
have less access to health relevant resources. These results are qualitatively consistent with
similar studies in the U.K. Taylor et al. (2006), using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) from 1991 to 2003, a period that covers the recession in the early nineties, found
that being past due on mortgage debt is associated with a negative psychological effect
among men, controlling for financial conditions and other personal traits. Nettleton and
Burrows (1998), using the Survey of English Housing4 from 1991-1992 and 1994-1995, found
that difficulty meeting mortgage payments is associated with a decline in mental well-being.
Previous studies have also examined the effect of unsecured debt on health. Drentea
and Lavrakas (2000), using a sample of adults in Ohio, found that greater credit card debt-
to-income is associated with a greater likelihood of physical health impairment. In a follow
up study, Drentea (2000) found that greater credit card debt-to-income is associated with
a greater likelihood of having mental anxiety. Similarly, Brown et al. (2005), using the
4The Survey of English Housing is a supplemental survey to the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
consisting of households headed by younger individuals, single parents, single male parents, divorced and
separated, divorced and inactive.
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1995 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), found that greater
unsecured household debt is associated with the likelihood of having poor mental health.
Keese and Schmitz (2010), using the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) from 1999-
2009, found that greater debt is associated with worse mental health and a higher incidence
of obesity. They also estimated a fixed effects model to control for individual-specific, time-
invariant factors that may be endogenous to health and debt. Fixed effects estimates show
that greater indebtedness leads to poor mental health and lower health satisfaction with
mortgage debt having a large effect on mental health. Though, loan amounts of unsecured
debt are typically less than that of mortgage, these findings suggest that even unsecured
debt has a negative effect on health.
Finally, a number of studies have examined the effect of self-reported financial stress
on health. Bridges and Disney (2010) and Skapinakis et al. (2006) found that individuals
experiencing financial difficulties were more likely to exhibit depression. O’Neill et al. (2005)
and Lyons and Yilmazer (2005) found a positive correlation between self-reported financial
stress and poor self-reported health. While these studies show a negative relationship
between financial stress and health, the particular type of debt leading to financial stress
was not identified.
The literature on the health effects of debt has primarily focused the household’s ability
to make debt repayments, that is, whether the household is liquidity constrained. Another
measure of a household’s financial condition is the debt to asset ratio, an indicator of
balance sheet leverage. In contrast to prior studies, this study focuses on households with
high mortgage debt to assets but not necessarily delinquent or in default. We argue that
households with a high mortgage loan to home value (LTV) also experience financial stress
given that debt secured by the primary residence comprise the largest share of household
balance sheets. Since the number of homeowners with high leverage is larger than the
number in delinquency or foreclosure, we argue that the potential effect of having high LTV
on health is relevant to a broader segment of the population5.
In this paper we examine the effect of housing leverage in conjunction with unemploy-
5For example, Alley et al. (2011), using only the HRS 2008 participants eligible to be asked mortgage-
delinquency questions, reported a mortgage delinquency rate of 3 percent whereas, using the complete NLSY
2008 wave, 13 percent of mortgagors have high LTV.
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ment. Previous studies have found unemployment is associated with an increase in mor-
tality. Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) found that, on average, unemployment increases
mortality hazard by 10 – 15%, implying a decrease in life expectancy of 1 – 1. 5 years
for workers displaced in middle age. The effect is strongest immediately after a layoff but
persists twenty years after displacement and is largest for those less than 45 years of age.
S. A. Burgand and House (2007) used two large population-based longitudinal samples to
examine the effect of layoffs on self-reported health. They found a negative correlation
between unemployment and health even after carefully controlling for selection bias.
3.3 Data
Individual level data on health, housing, financial situation, and other socioeconomic factors
were obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), part of the
National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) program. These respondents were between 45 and
53 years of age at their 2008 interview. The NLSY79 is composed of three independent
subsamples. The first consists of a cross-sectional sample (6,111) of people living in the
United States in 1979 and born between January 1, 1957, and December 31, 1964 (inclusive);
the second (5,295), over samples Hispanic, Latino, black, and economically disadvantaged
persons, also living in the United States and born in the same period as the cross sectional
sample, while the third (1,280) is limited to persons born between January 1, 1957, through
December 31, 1961 (inclusive), serving in the military as of September 30, 1978. Since
our interest in this paper is to extend our results as broadly as possible, we eliminate the
military segment.
3.3.1 Variable definitions
The NLSY administers an extended health module once a respondent turns forty years of
age. The SF-12, which stands for short-form 12-question, is a brief inventory of self-reported
mental and physical health. This scale was administered to respondents who had turned 40
since their last interview as part of the age 40+ health module, included in the 1998, 2000,
2002, 2004, and 2006 surveys.
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As part of this module, respondents are asked to self-rate their health, on a scale of 1
to 5. We convert this to a dichotomous variable, with one representing those with poor to
fair overall health. This is our main dependent variable of interest. Additionally, we look
at the effect on other health measures, including obesity, hypertension, frequency of colds,
symptoms of depression, and trouble sleeping.
Households experience financial stress when the burden of mortgage indebtedness be-
comes excessive. To measure excessive mortgage indebtedness, we use the loan to value
(LTV) ratio defined as the amount of mortgage loan outstanding plus any other amount
owed on home divided by the self-reported home value. LTV measures the degree of lever-
age used to finance the primary residence, which, all else equal, declines over time given
the amortizing nature of mortgage loans. However, if homeowners take out equity and/or
housing values decline, then home equity is reduced and may even become negative. As
well, homeowners with a high LTV cannot reduce housing consumption accordingly and
even if they manage to sell the home, they are more likely to incur a financial loss due
to lower equity and transaction fees. Therefore, we hypothesize that high LTV, through
financial stress, leads to a greater likelihood of a negative health outcome.
We control for age, education, race, employment, marital status and gender at the time
the 40+ health module was administered. We follow (Thompson (2011)), and use both
the mean of each respondent’s annual household income and the standard deviation of
income as independent variables. Income data was inflated to 2006 dollars using the CPI-
U-RS. This is done in recognition of health being a stock variable (Grossman (1972) and
thus affected by past investments, which are related to income. We include the standard
deviation of earnings to control for volatility; fluctuations in income as well as low income
may have effects on health. Since our primary research interest concerns the effect of hosing
leverage, we match income data to years of homeownership. Since health also has genetic
characteristics we control for early mortality of respondents’ parents by creating an indicator
variable which is zero if the parent died at age 60 or older, and one if the parent died before
60 years of age. We also interact unemployment with LTV, hypothesizing that the effect of
the two on health may not be purely additive.
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3.4 Estimation Model
Our main estimation of the effect of LTV on health is as follows:
Hi40 = β0 + β1Di + β2WksUnempi +XiΘ+ ϵi
where Hi40 is a health condition measured at the time of the 40+ health module, Di
is an indicator variable for high mortgage loan to self-reported home value (measured as
greater than 0.8), WksUnempi is the number of weeks the respondent has been unem-
ployed in the past year, and Xi is a vector of variables for respondent’s socioeconomic
characteristics including highest grade completed, wage (dollars/1000), gender, number of
weeks the respondent has been out of labor force in the past year, race/ethnicity, marital
status, whether the respondent has health insurance, lives in an MSA, and the respondent’s
parents’ characteristics such as mother’s highest grade completed, father’s highest grade
completed, whether mother’s age at death is less than 60, and whether father’s age at death
is less than 60.
Interaction of Unemployment and High Loan-to-Value: Effect on Health
The following equation highlights our specification which interacts involuntary unemploy-
ment and high loan-to-value:
Hi40 = β0 + β1Di + β2WksUnempi + β3Di ×WksUnempi +XiΘ+ ϵi
Effect of LTV on investment in health care
We test our sub-hypothesis that the effect of housing leverage on health may be indirect; as
leverage increases, respondents may be less likely or less able to invest in health care. Our
estimation model for the effect of high loan to value on use of health care pools the data
from the 2002 survey through the 2008 survey. We measure the effect of high LTV on the
likelihood of failing to have an annual physical as follows:
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LastPhysical > 1Y rit = β0 + β1Dit + β2WksUnempit +XitΘ+ ϵi
This first specification regresses mortgage, home value, unemployment and a host of socioe-
conomic variables on not having had a physical in the last year. Then we run high LTV
and the socioeconomic variables on the same independent variable, and perform a third
specification where we interact unemployment and high LTV, in keeping with our main
model. The interaction equation is provided below.
LastPhysical > 1Y rit = β0 + β1Dit + β2WksUnempit + β3Dit ×WksUnempit +XiΘ+ ϵi
Temporal Ordering
Since the 40+ health module is administered to NLSY79 respondents only once, generally in
the interview immediately following their turning 40 years of age, fixed effects estimation can
not be done with this data. Additionally, our examination of the trends in health outcomes
both in this data set and the HRS shows very little movement of these dichotomous variables
over time, indicating that they do not lend themselves to fixed effects estimation, which relies
on variation around the mean for identification of the effect being studied. We therefore
decided to follow other researchers who used the NLSY79, primarily Thompson (2011),
and employ temporal ordering, whereby independent variables are measured over prior
time periods (t-1), and the dependent variable measured at time t. The temporal ordering
model for health as a function of mortgage indebtedness and socioeconomic factors is given
by
Hi40 = β0 + β1Dit + β2WksUnempit + β2Dit ×WksUnempit
+ β4Dit−1 + β5WksUnempit−1 + β6Dit−1 +×WksUnempit−1 +XiΘ+ ϵi
where Hi40 is overall health as self-reported at the time of the 40+ health module, Dit is
an indicator for high LTV, WksUnempit is the number of weeks unemployed in the last
year, Dit × WksUnempit is the interaction of weeks unemployment and high LTV, Xi is
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a vector of socioeconomic variables which includes gender, age, education, race/ethnicity,
and marital status for individual i at the time they answered the 40+ health module, and
Θ is a vector of parameters.
3.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 shows the sample-weighted means for the socioeconomic, health, and housing
finance variables for mortgagors in the NLSY79 who responded to the 40 and older health
module. The average mortgage value is just over $108,000, while home values average
$215,000. Fifteen percent of the sample fall into the high loan-to-value category, i.e., loan-to-
value is greater than 80%. (We chose 80% as a threshold since 20% equity has traditionally
been required by mortgage providers and for Fannie/Freddie eligibility. Our results are
robust to alterations to this threshold, however). The mean leverage is just under sixty
percent. Both the absolute leverage and amount of the sample falling into the high LTV
category are higher than the same measures for the HRS sample, which were 45% and 11%,
respectively. This is as expected, since equity generally builds with housing tenure, which
is positively correlated with age. Only 7% of the mortgagors in the NLSY79 self-report fair
to poor health, but over 50% are obese, 23% suffer from hypertension, 25% from depressive
symptoms.
3.5 Results
OLS cross sectional results are reported in Table 3.2. Evaluated independently, larger
mortgages, more expensive homes are negatively correlated with poor health outcomes,
though only home value’s effect on obesity and hypertension are statistically significant
(the former at the 10% level, the latter at the 5% level). The lack of significance for most of
the outcomes is most likely due to multicollinearity: we are regressing home value, mortgage
value, wages, on our health outcomes, all of which we expect to be correlated. The signs on
the other socioeconomic variables are as expected, with education strongly correlated with
better health, married respondents, respondents in the labor force and females healthier
than their counterparts.
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Table 3.3 show the effect of high mortgage loan to home value on the likelihood or
each of the health outcomes. The likelihood of being obese is 5.24% greater for mortgagors
with loan-to-values greater than eighty percent; this result is significant at the 10% level.
Both weeks unemployed and weeks out of the labor force are significantly correlated with
reporting worse overall health, being depressed, and having trouble sleeping. Since health
has a genetic component, we control for the age of death of parents, and we account for
early childhood factors by controlling for parents’ education.
As expected, when we interact high loan-to-value with weeks of involuntary unemploy-
ment, Table 3.4, our results increase in significance: the likelihood of being in poor health or
having frequent colds is significant at the 5% level; the effect on hypertension is significant
at the 10% level.
Since higher mortgage indebtedness corresponds to a negative wealth effect, it can lead
to fewer health investments, particularly preventative care. We therefore perform a third
estimation where we look at whether high LTV has a negative effect on respondents’ propen-
sity to have an annual physical exam. The results in Table 3.5 suggest that any effect high
LTV has on getting a routine physical is insignificant, but that involuntary unemployment
can lead respondents’ to skip physicals. That this is most likely tied to a lack of insurance
for the unemployed is supported by the highly (1% level), significant impact the presence of
health insurance has on the likelihood of getting an annual physical, in all three specifica-
tions. Insured respondents were 20% less likely to go more than a year without a physical
than the overall sample of mortgagors. Interestingly, when we interact weeks of unemploy-
ment with high LTV, the sign on the coefficient switches: respondents with high mortgage
loans to house values and more weeks of involuntary unemployment are more likely to get
an annual physical than respondents with similar weeks of unemployment but less highly
leveraged. This may support our argument that high LTV harms health and therefore
makes the respondent feel more in need of a physical exam, but this is only conjecture.
There may be other factors at play.
Table 3.6 gives strong support to our hypothesis that for this sample, health will be
negatively affected by involuntary unemployment contemporaneous with high LTV. We see
that past high LTV interacted with past weeks of unemployment have the greatest effect
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on poor health, so long as we look back only one period (the time between surveys), with
significance at the 1% level. The effect loses significance if further in the past, possibly
pointing to the resiliency of the population. Unemployment in a prior period has a sig-
nificant effect on poor health in all specifications, whereas the effect of high LTV is only
significant if current high LTV and unemployment are omitted form the regression. (Re-
sults of averaging LTV and income over the tenure of homeownership, then regressing these
averages and the standard deviation of income against health outcomes were insignificant,
and are therefore not reported here. We expected the standard deviation of income to have
an effect, since income volatility is generally viewed negatively, but since this is a relatively
young sample in a mostly robust economy, we feel that there were probably few negative
shocks, and it is negative shocks which are likely to have adverse health effects.)
3.6 Discussion
As in our previous research, we find that when viewed separately, neither having a large
mortgage nor an expensive home has a significant effect on overall health or the prevalence of
depressive symptoms. However, for mortgagors in the NLSY79, high LTV has a significant
effect on the likelihood of being obese only, amongst the five health outcomes we measure.
For the HRS sample, results of the effect of high LTV are highly significant on all health
outcomes. When high LTV is interacted with weeks of unemployment, the probability of
reporting fair to poor health increases by almost 1 percentage point, which is significant
at the 5% level. Additionally, the interaction of these two variables causes significant
increases in hypertension and frequency of colds for mortgagors. These results support
both our hypothesis that high LTV is less stressful for younger people who are more likely
to have earned income which can be used to reduce leverage, and time to build equity before
retirement, and our second hypothesis that unemployment coupled with high LTV will have
a negative impact on health.
We do not find that those with high loan-to-value neglect basic preventative care, which
we measure as whether or not respondents had an annual physical exam, but the number
of weeks of unemployment is positively correlated with not having an annual physical.
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We employ temporal ordering to support causality running from debt and unemployment
to worse health. The OLS results might be a result of reverse causality, with poor health
leading to higher debt. We cannot rule out reverse causality given that poor health has a
significant and larger effect on the likelihood of high LTV in two years in Table 3.7 .
From a policy perspective, our results highlight the unintended health consequences
of promoting financing for home purchases when labor markets are characterized by less
stability, with shorter tenures at the same firm and more frequent unemployment spells.
Policymakers should consider whether the benefits of homeownership outweigh the negative
health effects of high mortgage indebtedness for persons who will experience spells of un-
employment. Additionally, improvements in financial literacy should increase homeowners’
awareness of the pitfalls of high leverage. This is of high importance in areas of the country
where decent rental housing is in scant supply, and some leverage likely required to have a
desirable home.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics (NLSY79 40 and older health module)
Mortgagors
mortgage loan (dollars/1000) 108.17
home value (dollars/1000) 214.90
mortgage loan-to-home value 0.59
high LTV 0.15
weeks unemployed (past year) 0.87
weeks out of labor force (past year) 4.01
wage (dollars/1000) 47.00







lives in MSA 0.16
highest grade completed 14.11
mother’s highest grade completed 12.02
father’s highest grade completed 12.26
mother’s age at death < 60 0.07
father’s age at death < 60 0.12
poor health 0.07
physical health z-score 53.47








High LTV defined as LTV>0.80
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Table 3.2: OLS: Effect of mortgage loan and home value on the likelihood of each health
condition.
poor health obesity hypertension freq colds cesd>5 trouble sleeping
mortgage loan (dollars/1000) -0.0000261 -0.000118 -0.0000901 -0.000108 -0.0000521 0.0000281
(0.0000576) (0.000118) (0.0000768) (0.000136) (0.000133) (0.0000853)
home value (dollars/1000) -0.0000460 -0.000104∗ -0.0000729∗∗ -0.0000474 -0.0000314 -0.0000567
(0.0000294) (0.0000552) (0.0000305) (0.0000569) (0.0000534) (0.0000416)
weeks unemployed (past year) 0.00279∗∗ -0.00213 0.000172 0.0000644 0.00266∗ 0.00396∗∗
(0.00135) (0.00148) (0.00118) (0.00146) (0.00151) (0.00155)
weeks out of labor force (past year) 0.00141∗∗∗ -0.000950 0.000561 0.000682 0.00196∗∗∗ 0.00274∗∗∗
(0.000499) (0.000719) (0.000558) (0.000677) (0.000662) (0.000638)
wage (dollars/1000) -0.000113 -0.000196 -0.0000299 -0.000147 -0.000145 -0.000245
(0.000101) (0.000243) (0.000176) (0.000229) (0.000155) (0.000157)
female -0.00632 -0.0406∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0238∗
(0.0100) (0.0189) (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0138) (0.0125)
hispanic -0.0125 0.0514∗ -0.0371∗∗ -0.0432∗ 0.0105 -0.0306∗
(0.0147) (0.0280) (0.0177) (0.0238) (0.0202) (0.0182)
black 0.00189 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ -0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0117 -0.0270
(0.0139) (0.0271) (0.0209) (0.0214) (0.0193) (0.0171)
married -0.0239∗ 0.0351∗ 0.00652 -0.0282 -0.0547∗∗∗ -0.0507∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0208) (0.0160) (0.0190) (0.0170) (0.0158)
insured -0.0453∗∗ -0.0365 -0.0449∗ -0.0117 -0.0447 -0.0326
(0.0227) (0.0354) (0.0259) (0.0289) (0.0277) (0.0257)
lives in MSA 0.0112 0.0171 0.0200 0.0434∗∗ 0.00921 0.0219
(0.0118) (0.0226) (0.0165) (0.0198) (0.0163) (0.0153)
highest grade completed -0.00834∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.00231 0.0114∗∗∗ -0.00970∗∗∗ -0.00305
(0.00210) (0.00387) (0.00280) (0.00354) (0.00291) (0.00265)
mother’s highest grade completed -0.00299 -0.00115 0.00515∗ -0.00209 0.000839 -0.00105
(0.00203) (0.00405) (0.00279) (0.00354) (0.00290) (0.00254)
father’s highest grade completed 0.000304 -0.000283 -0.00286 0.00324 0.00277 0.00114
(0.00166) (0.00312) (0.00217) (0.00277) (0.00228) (0.00195)
mother’s age at death < 60 0.0168 0.0294 0.0137 -0.0144 0.0184 0.00180
(0.0186) (0.0333) (0.0245) (0.0273) (0.0245) (0.0221)
father’s age at death < 60 0.0130 -0.0255 0.0426∗∗ 0.00854 -0.0214 -0.0290∗
(0.0146) (0.0255) (0.0204) (0.0227) (0.0183) (0.0161)
Observations 3194 2535 3195 3195 3179 3195
R2 0.038 0.050 0.033 0.025 0.035 0.038
Robust errors in parentheses
All specifications include age and year indicator variables
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Table 3.3: OLS: Effect of mortgage loan-to-home value on the likelihood of each health
condition.
poor health obesity hypertension freq colds cesd>5 trouble sleeping
high LTV 0.0185 0.0524∗∗ -0.00400 -0.00393 0.0000196 0.00943
(0.0138) (0.0251) (0.0174) (0.0204) (0.0176) (0.0163)
weeks unemployed (past year) 0.00272∗∗ -0.00232 0.00000589 -0.0000708 0.00257∗ 0.00390∗∗
(0.00136) (0.00146) (0.00118) (0.00148) (0.00153) (0.00156)
weeks out of labor force (past year) 0.00128∗∗∗ -0.00131∗ 0.000301 0.000469 0.00185∗∗∗ 0.00262∗∗∗
(0.000489) (0.000710) (0.000552) (0.000669) (0.000652) (0.000632)
wage (dollars/1000) -0.000211∗∗ -0.000463∗∗ -0.000242 -0.000325 -0.000239∗ -0.000328∗∗
(0.0000919) (0.000231) (0.000167) (0.000203) (0.000143) (0.000138)
female -0.00760 -0.0435∗∗ -0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0594∗∗∗ 0.0225∗
(0.00999) (0.0188) (0.0139) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0124)
hispanic -0.0152 0.0426 -0.0413∗∗ -0.0472∗∗ 0.00871 -0.0319∗
(0.0146) (0.0279) (0.0177) (0.0236) (0.0200) (0.0181)
black 0.00245 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0568∗∗∗ 0.0126 -0.0253
(0.0140) (0.0272) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0173)
married -0.0245∗ 0.0345∗ 0.00396 -0.0302 -0.0562∗∗∗ -0.0514∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0209) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0170) (0.0158)
insured -0.0478∗∗ -0.0459 -0.0503∗ -0.0167 -0.0452 -0.0350
(0.0226) (0.0352) (0.0259) (0.0289) (0.0277) (0.0257)
lives in MSA 0.0117 0.0194 0.0220 0.0454∗∗ 0.00895 0.0224
(0.0118) (0.0225) (0.0165) (0.0198) (0.0163) (0.0152)
highest grade completed -0.00895∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗ -0.00358 0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.00346
(0.00207) (0.00384) (0.00278) (0.00352) (0.00286) (0.00264)
mother’s highest grade completed -0.00320 -0.00174 0.00470∗ -0.00251 0.000732 -0.00121
(0.00203) (0.00403) (0.00280) (0.00355) (0.00290) (0.00254)
father’s highest grade completed 0.000224 -0.000537 -0.00315 0.00299 0.00265 0.00105
(0.00166) (0.00312) (0.00217) (0.00276) (0.00228) (0.00196)
mother’s age at death < 60 0.0156 0.0240 0.0123 -0.0154 0.0178 0.000692
(0.0186) (0.0333) (0.0246) (0.0273) (0.0246) (0.0221)
father’s age at death < 60 0.0120 -0.0302 0.0418∗∗ 0.00759 -0.0207 -0.0297∗
(0.0146) (0.0256) (0.0205) (0.0227) (0.0183) (0.0161)
Observations 3194 2535 3195 3195 3179 3195
R2 0.037 0.047 0.030 0.024 0.035 0.038
Robust errors in parentheses
All specifications include age and year indicator variables
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Table 3.4: OLS: Effect of mortgage loan-to-home value interacted with unemployment on
the likelihood of each health condition.
poor health obesity hypertension freq colds cesd>5 trouble sleeping
high LTV 0.0111 0.0560∗∗ -0.0111 -0.0124 -0.00347 0.00769
(0.0135) (0.0255) (0.0174) (0.0206) (0.0177) (0.0164)
weeks unemployed (past year) 0.00154 -0.00178 -0.00113 -0.00142 0.00201 0.00362∗∗
(0.00131) (0.00160) (0.00116) (0.00145) (0.00157) (0.00167)
high LTV × weeks unemployed 0.00949∗∗ -0.00428 0.00911∗ 0.0109∗∗ 0.00444 0.00223
(0.00475) (0.00339) (0.00486) (0.00456) (0.00483) (0.00462)
weeks out of labor force (past year) 0.00127∗∗∗ -0.00130∗ 0.000293 0.000460 0.00185∗∗∗ 0.00262∗∗∗
(0.000489) (0.000710) (0.000552) (0.000669) (0.000652) (0.000632)
wage (dollars/1000) -0.000219∗∗ -0.000459∗∗ -0.000250 -0.000335∗ -0.000243∗ -0.000330∗∗
(0.0000915) (0.000231) (0.000167) (0.000203) (0.000143) (0.000138)
female -0.00803 -0.0432∗∗ -0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0224∗
(0.00995) (0.0188) (0.0139) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0124)
hispanic -0.0166 0.0436 -0.0427∗∗ -0.0489∗∗ 0.00801 -0.0322∗
(0.0146) (0.0279) (0.0177) (0.0236) (0.0200) (0.0181)
black 0.00285 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0563∗∗∗ 0.0128 -0.0252
(0.0140) (0.0272) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0173)
married -0.0240∗ 0.0344∗ 0.00441 -0.0296 -0.0560∗∗∗ -0.0513∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0208) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0170) (0.0158)
insured -0.0466∗∗ -0.0467 -0.0492∗ -0.0153 -0.0446 -0.0347
(0.0225) (0.0352) (0.0257) (0.0287) (0.0277) (0.0258)
lives in MSA 0.0115 0.0197 0.0217 0.0451∗∗ 0.00882 0.0224
(0.0118) (0.0225) (0.0165) (0.0198) (0.0163) (0.0152)
highest grade completed -0.00899∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗ -0.00361 0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.00347
(0.00207) (0.00384) (0.00278) (0.00352) (0.00286) (0.00264)
mother’s highest grade completed -0.00307 -0.00180 0.00482∗ -0.00236 0.000793 -0.00118
(0.00203) (0.00403) (0.00280) (0.00354) (0.00290) (0.00255)
father’s highest grade completed 0.000187 -0.000516 -0.00318 0.00295 0.00263 0.00104
(0.00164) (0.00312) (0.00218) (0.00276) (0.00227) (0.00196)
mother’s age at death < 60 0.0144 0.0244 0.0111 -0.0168 0.0172 0.000406
(0.0188) (0.0333) (0.0244) (0.0273) (0.0246) (0.0221)
father’s age at death < 60 0.0133 -0.0309 0.0431∗∗ 0.00908 -0.0201 -0.0294∗
(0.0146) (0.0256) (0.0204) (0.0227) (0.0183) (0.0161)
Observations 3194 2535 3195 3195 3179 3195
R2 0.041 0.048 0.031 0.026 0.036 0.038
Robust errors in parentheses
All specifications include age and year indicator variables
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Table 3.5: OLS: Effect of housing leverage on the whether it has been more than a year
since last physical exam (NLSY79 Pooled 2002-2008).
>1 year since last physical >1 year since last physical >1 year since last physical
mortgage loan (dollars/1000) 0.0000412
(0.0000486)
home value (dollars/1000) 0.00000481
(0.0000222)
high LTV -0.00470 -0.000800
(0.0125) (0.0127)
weeks unemployed (past year) 0.00188∗∗ 0.00192∗∗ 0.00258∗∗∗
(0.000860) (0.000859) (0.000950)
high LTV × weeks unemployed -0.00381∗
(0.00203)
weeks out of labor force (past year) -0.000343 -0.000291 -0.000291
(0.000328) (0.000326) (0.000326)
wage (dollars/1000) -0.000110 -0.0000675 -0.0000668
(0.000117) (0.000113) (0.000113)
female -0.152∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108)
hispanic -0.0263 -0.0244 -0.0242
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0163)
black -0.164∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131)
married -0.0314∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115)
insured -0.203∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182)
lives in MSA -0.00970 -0.00990 -0.00970
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
highest grade completed -0.000445 -0.0000838 -0.0000286
(0.00234) (0.00232) (0.00232)
mother’s highest grade completed 0.00240 0.00252 0.00248
(0.00234) (0.00234) (0.00234)
father’s highest grade completed -0.000117 -0.0000209 -0.00000124
(0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00184)
mother’s age at death < 60 -0.00211 -0.00211 -0.00213
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0184)
father’s age at death < 60 -0.0229 -0.0223 -0.0226
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148)
Observations 13049 13049 13049
R2 0.069 0.069 0.069
Robust errors clustered on individuals in parentheses
All specifications include age and year indicator variables
72
Table 3.6: OLS: Effect of current and lagged mortgage loan-to-home value interacted with
current and lagged unemployment on the likelihood of poor health.
poor health poor health poor health poor health
high LTV 0.0115 0.00860 0.00989
(0.0133) (0.0176) (0.0210)
weeks unemployed 0.00154 0.000890 0.000767
(0.00131) (0.00124) (0.00126)
high LTV × weeks unemployed 0.00950∗∗ 0.0123∗∗ 0.0104∗
(0.00473) (0.00488) (0.00568)
1-lag high LTV 0.00342 0.0213 0.0311∗
(0.0152) (0.0203) (0.0174)
1-lags weeks unemployed 0.00361∗ 0.00405∗∗ 0.00416∗∗
(0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00204)
1-lag high LTV × weeks unemployed 0.00965∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗
(0.00492) (0.00469) (0.00473)
2-lags high LTV 0.00151 0.0000780
(0.0136) (0.0138)
2-lags weeks unemployed 0.00111 0.00109
(0.00209) (0.00208)
2-lags high LTV × weeks unemployed -0.00365 -0.00369
(0.00256) (0.00255)
Observations 3194 2625 2238 2238
R2 0.041 0.048 0.051 0.045
Robust errors in parentheses
All specifications include full set of control variables
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Table 3.7: OLS: Effect of poor health on the likelihood of high LTV in 2 years.





weeks unemployed (past year) 0.000627
(0.000886)
high LTV × weeks unemployed 0.00474
(0.00441)














lives in MSA -0.000896
(0.0137)
highest grade completed 0.000807
(0.00256)
mother’s highest grade completed 0.00273
(0.00262)
father’s highest grade completed -0.00122
(0.00195)
mother’s age at death < 60 0.0101
(0.0204)




Robust errors in parentheses
All specifications include age and year indicator variables
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